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Executive Summary

M

ichigan has a problem. By several measures,

for Michigan to begin to reclaim its legacy of educational
excellence and equity.

the achievement of students attending its K–12
educational system has not kept pace with other
states. Although Michigan’s student achievement
has improved over the past decade, the improvement has
been modest, and achievement in many other states has
easily surpassed that in Michigan. Furthermore, despite
a funding system based on an equitable allocation of
resources, Michigan has persistent gaps in achievement
across income groups that have not narrowed over time.
These trends have grave consequences for the future of
Michigan’s children as well as for Michigan’s economy.
Substantial evidence shows that sagging test scores lower
the future earnings potential of individuals and slow the
economic growth of states. We believe it is time to accelerate
the state’s educational and economic progress. It is time

Addressing Michigan’s education problem requires additional
resources. After spending the past 12 months conducting an
extensive literature review and analyzing national and state
data, researchers at the Upjohn Institute have concluded
that resources are key to student academic success. More
resources are needed to reach higher levels of achievement
and to close the gaps in achievement between students from
different socioeconomic backgrounds. Unfortunately, the
situation with resources is quite similar to the situation with
student achievement. Michigan has been slowly increasing
resources for students, but virtually all other states have
increased their spending faster. Thus Michigan is losing
ground to its competitor states in terms of educational

Figure ES-1. Michigan and U.S. Math Scores on NAEP, by Year
300

277

280

273

260

240

273

220

226

229

◆

◆

224

226

281

283

284

X

X

X

285

X

276

277

277

278

280

280

236

238

238

240

241

238

240

236

X

X

X

272

279

278

◆

235

◆

◆

◆

MI 4th grade math NAEP score
MI 8th grade math NAEP score

200
1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

◆

2003

2005

2007

◆

236

X

242

◆

237

US 4th grade math NAEP score

X

US 8th grade math NAEP score

2009

2011

2013

SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).

ES-1

UPJOHN INSTITUTE

W.E.

For Employment Research

Figure ES-2. Michigan and U.S. Total Revenue per Pupil, by Year
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system investment. Figures ES-1 (Page ES-1) and ES-2 show
how Michigan has ominously gone from above to below the
national average in student achievement and total per-pupil
revenue.

The Potential Economic Payoff
Michigan’s standing vis-à-vis other states is not just a
matter of state pride. Michigan’s educational achievement
disadvantages relative to the nation are sufficient to predict
future earnings for Michigan students that are about 2
percent below what they would be if Michigan’s test scores

matched the national average. Two percent may sound
minor, but a 2 percent disadvantage added up over a career
is a significant amount of money. On average, the present
discounted value of a worker’s earnings over her career is
over $900,000, so 2 percent extra earnings would have a
present value of over $18,000.1 Applying an $18,000 career
earnings boost to each of the approximately 1.5 million K–12
students in Michigan results in a potentially huge total state
benefit: over $27 billion in the present value of extra career
earnings for this group of students, and of course, as more
students come into the system, the boost to the economy

These calculations use very conservative assumptions. They rely on NAEP test scores for 2012, the relationship between test scores and lifetime earnings in
Chetty et al. (2011), earnings of all individuals aged 16 to 80 in the 2012 American Community Survey (ACS), and a real discount rate of 3.0 percent. Present
discounted values treat future earnings as less valuable than present earnings; that is, they are discounted to make them of comparable worth to today’s earnings.
The rationale is that money today could be invested and worth more than the same amount in the future, even after accounting for inflation.
1
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grows even bigger. Thus there is a large economic stake to
even small improvements in average academic achievement
for Michigan’s students.2

Limited State Resources
Given that Michigan’s student achievement has lost ground
compared to other states, and given the conclusion that
more resources are needed to reach higher levels of
achievement and to close the gaps, it would be easy to
recommend that the state should appropriate significantly
more funds in order to improve its K–12 system. However,
that recommendation becomes difficult to make when one
acknowledges that by many measures, Michigan is already
among the leading states in the percentage of its fiscal
capacity that gets spent on K–12 education. As a proportion
of gross state product (GSP), the state spends more on
K–12 education than any other states. The problem is
that Michigan’s fiscal capacity to fund K–12 education has
declined. Michigan’s GSP per capita has fallen from 23rd in
1992 to 30th in 2011, and its growth rate over this time ranks
49th among the states.
In a nutshell, prior to the last two decades, Michigan was a
relatively affluent state that spent a relatively high amount of
its resources on K–12 education. The two recessions in the
2000s—and Michigan’s lack of recovery between them—
and the decade-long restructuring of the auto industry
devastated our state economy. So Michigan’s fiscal capacity
has shrunk, but legacy costs and an apparent commitment
to education meant that the share of its fiscal capacity that
goes to education has stayed relatively high.

Another Resource Issue
Not only is the level of resources important, but how those
resources are spent also influences student achievement.

We suggest that the use of
resources in Michigan may be skewed.
While Michigan ranks 26th in instructional
expenditures per student, it ranks 40th in the
percentage of K–12 revenue spent on instruction. Less
than half of the revenue (from all sources) devoted to K–12
education in our state goes to instruction. Legacy costs,
student support services, and declining enrollments have
reduced the proportion of educational resources that are
available for instruction. Michigan ranks 6th in the share of
expenditures going to both employee benefits and student
support services, which takes away money that could be
spent on instruction. Therefore, stakeholders in the Michigan
K–12 system need to establish policies and incentives that
direct more revenue to classroom instruction in order to
boost student achievement.

A Conundrum and Potential Solutions
Michigan is left with a conundrum. It is time to stop trailing
its competitor states, and we believe that to do so will
require resources. But the resource base in the state is quite
limited. We believe that there are three potential solutions.
First, because the situation is so dire, the state needs to
“dig deep” and find some additional state resources. In the
recommendations that we enumerate below, we suggest that
these additional resources should be invested in an array
of targeted initiatives.3 Second, we think that the resources
that are extended to districts could and should be directed
to proven instructional programs/interventions. We have
entitled our recommended competitive grant program Smart
Educational Expenditure Demonstration (SEED) grants.
These grants would be limited to programs that have proven
research evidence of large educational results per dollar
spent.

As is widely recognized, higher education is a route to higher lifetime earnings. Ruggles et al. (2010) documents both the lag between the percent of the
population age 25 and over with at least an associate’s degree in Michigan and the U.S. average, and that the size of the difference is growing. The current study
does not specifically address higher education, but we would assert that it will be difficult to close the gap in higher education achievement between Michigan and
the rest of the country when the gap in K–12 student achievement is widening.
3
In our recommendations, we have used a target of an annual increase in the overall level of state funding of under $600 million. This would represent an
increase of less than 7 percent in overall school funding. It is, of course, up to the legislature to find the means, but we would point out that recent news reports
(http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/michigan/2015/02/18/michigan-business-tax-credit-liability/23614611/) suggest that annual costs of
ongoing MEGA business tax credits will be $500 million to $600 million per year for the next 15 years.
2
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The third solution to the conundrum of needing, but lacking,
effectively sets two levels of operational funding per pupil: a
resources is to expand the resource base to local property.
guaranteed minimum, called the “effective basic foundation”
Currently, local school districts have no ability to increase
grant, and a maximum level of support, called the “hold
4
funding through property taxes. Whereas the Common Core harmless threshold” level.
Data of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES)
reports that, in Michigan, 30 percent of total revenues come
Proposal A was not promulgated as a school improvement
from local sources, it should be recognized that local districts initiative per se. It did not have any regulations, incentives,
have virtually no discretion over these funds. The
or sanctions directed at teaching and learning. It
state has limited the local funding to a
was mainly intended to provide property
millage rate of up to 18.0 mills on nontax relief and improved per-pupil
homestead property, or in a very
funding equity. Of course, in
few districts to a hold harmless
accomplishing the latter, it
Proposal A was mainly
millage. As noted below, we
produced relative “gainers”
recommend that proposal A
and “losers.” To the extent
intended to provide property
should be amended to allow
that student achievement
tax
relief
and
improved
local districts to request
depends on funding levels,
voter approval for local
then we would expect that
per-pupil
funding
equity.
Of
millage enhancements that
Proposal A would have had
we believe should be subject
differential (relative) effects
course, in accomplishing the
to state equalization for
on student achievement that
property-value- poor districts.
would favor the “gainers.”
latter, it produced relative
Furthermore, we advocate
Using Michigan Educational
“gainers” and “losers.”
rigorous evaluation of the net
Assessment Program (MEAP)
impact of those funds on student
results over the years just before
achievement.
and just after the implementation of
Proposal A, Professor Leslie Papke from
Proposal A and Its Shortcomings
Michigan State University showed that for each
In addition to calling for more resources, we believe that
$1,000 increase in per-pupil spending, there was an increase
the current funding mechanism in the state — Proposal A
of between 2.2 and 3.7 percentage points in the 4th grade
foundation grant plus categoricals — needs to be adjusted.
math passing rate. When she looked at schools in lowerPrior to the 1994–95 school year, Michigan districts were
spending districts that received greater funding increases
funded by local property taxes that were equalized by the
after the implementation of Proposal A, the increase was
state. In the 1993–94 school year, for example, the state
between 3.2 and 10.3 percentage points; among schools in
guaranteed districts $102.50 per mill plus fixed-dollar
higher-spending districts, the increase was only between 1.3
payments per pupil of $400. In the 1994–95 school year,
and 2.6 percentage points. The MEAP passing rates went up
with the implementation of Proposal A, the state funding
for all schools, on average, but the lower-spending districts’
mechanism drastically changed to a foundation grant
schools were the relative “gainers” when they received the
system. Under the foundation grant system, the state
additional revenue.

Districts that comprise an intermediate school district (ISD) may ask voters in the ISD for an enhancement millage. Very few of these enhancement millages have
succeeded because they require alignment of the needs and preferences of multiple districts that often have quite different needs and preferences.
4
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In the first few years after Proposal A was implemented
and Michigan’s economy was growing, all was well. Virtually
all districts got annual funding increases and experienced
increases in student achievement. Furthermore, interdistrict
equity was being achieved as “poorer” districts got relatively
larger state funding increases and had larger gains in student
achievement.
But in the 2000s, shortcomings in Proposal A’s funding
mechanism became apparent. The state’s fiscal distress
during this decade caused a rollback in the foundation
grant level and categorical supports. The foundation grant
was decreased by a nominal $470 per student between
the 2008–09 school year and the 2011–12 school year.
Even despite recent growth in state revenues, the current
foundation grant is less than the grant in the 2008–09 year.
When adjusted for inflation, the foundation grant’s reduction
is even greater. Furthermore, a categorical source of funding
for districts that were being held harmless, section 20(j), was
vetoed in 2009 and has not been reinstituted. With these
cuts in per-pupil revenue, districts have had to find expenses
to cut in order to maintain their fiscal balance.
Not only has the foundation grant been declining, but also
student enrollment in most districts has been declining. In
the 2002–03 school year, the state’s enrollment was over
1.71 million students in K–12. This has declined to 1.52 million
in 2013–14 (an 11 percent decrease) and is projected to
decline to just over 1.50 million by 2015–16. If the number
of districts in Michigan had remained constant, then this
overall drop in enrollment would have meant that the typical
district’s enrollment dropped by 11+ percent between 2002
and 2014. However, the number of districts has not remained
the same; there has been a dramatic increase in the number
of districts due mainly to growth in public charter schools.
So more than three-fourths of the traditional school districts
that existed in the 2002–03 school year have experienced
losses in enrollment and almost one-fourth of them have lost
25 percent or more.

Declining enrollment is a significant
problem for districts because the
reduction in expenditures that occurs
when enrollment drops by a student is far less than
the foundation grant that is lost. In other words, a loss
of enrollment typically results in a small decline in costs,
whereas the revenue associated with any student who leaves
a district declines by the entire foundation grant. If a small
number of students leave a district, they will most likely
come from several different classrooms or schools. Class
sizes may be slightly smaller, but the district will still have the
same number of classrooms and schools, and, of course, the
same number of teachers and building administrators, until
a sufficient number of students leave to warrant reducing
classes and teachers. If there are any cost savings, they
would come from a reduction in materials and possibly
from less time spent with individual students. Even if the
enrollment decline does allow a cut in teaching staff, the
teachers who are laid off will typically be lower paid, which
reduces the savings to below the district’s average costs.
The costs of educating a student may also vary substantially
due to the student mix. Students from poverty backgrounds
and English language learners (ELL) often times require
smaller class sizes, mentors, more time on task, or other
costly interventions in order to succeed. Michigan’s
categorical for at-risk students (31a) supplements the
foundation grant, but in the current fiscal year, the level
of assistance is around $600 per student (free lunch or
breakfast eligible), which is much less than supplements in
other states.5 Note that if ELL students are not eligible for atrisk funding, then these costs must be borne by the district.6
Another cost differential is the cost of delivering instruction
by grade level. Best practice for early elementary calls for
smaller class sizes, which implies more teachers and higher
costs per student, holding other things equal. Furthermore,
some subject matters in the secondary grades, such as in
the arts, sciences (lab courses), or career and technical

The executive budget that has been presented to the Michigan legislature increases this categorical by about $180 per eligible student for the next fiscal year.
However, even with this increase, Michigan’s support for these students pales compared to many other states.
6
For an English language learner to be eligible for at-risk funding, he or she must also meet at least one of six other criteria.
5
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education, may require materials and equipment, which
make them more expensive on a per student basis. Thus,
districts with relatively more small-sized elementary
classrooms or relatively more expensive secondary class
enrollments will have higher per student costs.

Learners from Low-Income Families:
Michigan Needs to Do Better

Attention to learners from low-income families is not just
a matter of cost differentials. Students from low-income
families, a disproportionate share of whom come from
disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups, should have equal
educational opportunities to other students. This becomes
Other important differentials in cost that vary across
problematic upon consideration of the finding in our study
districts are regional cost/price differentials and the amount
that low-income students are essentially in double jeopardy.
of transportation provided by districts. In addition to its
As is commonly known, there is a persistent achievement
deficiencies with respect to operational costs, the Proposal
gap between economically disadvantaged students (for
A financing mechanism does not address at all the costs of
which free or reduced price lunch eligibility serves
capital improvements and infrastructure costs.
as a proxy) and students who are not
Traditional districts must use millages
economically disadvantaged, but this
and thus depend on property values
gap is typically measured as a
for major capital or infrastructure
Our
analyses
show
difference in means. Our analyses
improvements. Charter schools
show that there is an interaction
do not have the opportunity
that
there
is
an
interaction
(or feedback loop) between
to ask voters for millages,
being an economically
and so they must use their
between being an economically
disadvantaged student
foundation grants or loans.
disadvantaged student and
and the percentage of
students in a district who are
Despite these obvious
the percentage of students in a
economically disadvantaged.
differences in the cost of
In other words, the gap in test
providing education across
district who are
scores between low-income
districts, Michigan’s current
students and non-low-income
funding mechanism does not
economically
students is much larger for
take them into account when
disadvantaged.
districts with a high percentage of
allocating revenue. The system’s
low-income students than for districts
funding completely neglects some
with a low percentage of low-income
important cost differentials (such as
students.
declining enrollment, grade level differences, or
regional cost differences) and barely addresses other cost
What can or should be done for students from low-income
differentials (such as economically disadvantaged students,
households? We have identified several exemplary states
English language learners, subject matter differences,
based on growth in achievement scores for low-income and
or varied transportation requirements). In this study, we
non-low-income students. All but one of these states invests
note that many other states, particularly leading states
at least $1,000 more than Michigan in state funding per lowwith better trends in achievement, do much more than
income student. For this and other reasons, we recommend
Michigan to address such cost differentials. We recommend
restricting a substantial share of the SEED grant initiative to
that Michigan take steps to begin to address these cost
districts with at least 50 percent free or reduced price lunch
differentials as well.
enrollment and increasing substantially the funding that goes
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to at-risk students. Furthermore, the at-risk funding needs to
be progressive. This can be accomplished by weighting the
funding by the share of low-income students.

The Study and Its Recommendations
Student achievement depends on a host of factors including
student characteristics, curriculum and instruction, time on
task, teacher quality, and parental and community support.
Our study focuses on the financing of K-12 education in
the state. To a large extent, finances determine the quality
and quantity of instruction provided to the state’s most
precious resource: its children. After a brief introductory
chapter, the second chapter of this report explains how
Proposal A radically altered the funding of K–12 education in
Michigan’s school districts, reviews studies of the influence
of that funding change on student achievement — including
supplementary analyses by our research team — and points
out the unintended consequences of Proposal A. The fact
that the state imposed a substantial change in its funding
mechanism in a relatively short span of time prompted a
number of studies, as researchers felt that the exogeneity
of the change could be used to identify the causal effect of
funding on achievement. Whereas the implementation of
Proposal A gave researchers an opportunity to identify the
impact of money on student achievement, it has also, over
the years, been shown to have shortcomings that should be
resolved.

with particular emphases on the
seven states identified as exemplary
in student achievement. The chapter also
examines how and why recent reforms have been
undertaken. Finally, it reviews studies that have shown
how these and other school finance reforms have affected
student achievement and other outcomes.
The final chapter of the report focuses on recommendations
based on our analyses and review of existing evidence.
Among these recommendations are the following:
n

n

Following the background chapter on Proposal A, the next
chapter of this report examines student achievement in
Michigan and other states. The cross-state comparisons use
NAEP data, which is the only source of information that can
be used for this sort of comparative analysis. In addition, we
use MEAP data to examine student achievement results in
Michigan that extend beyond previous studies. The chapter
also addresses the methodology and data that we used to
select seven exemplary states that may hold useful lessons
for Michiganders.
The fourth chapter delves into education financing. It
provides detail about the mechanisms used in other states,

n

The state should implement a four-year competitive
grant program for districts (traditional and charter
schools) to offer services/interventions that have
been shown to be more effective at increasing
student achievement than simply expanding
resources. The districts that receive grants will be
required to evaluate the efficacy of their service/
intervention. A funding level of $200 million for this
Smart Expenditure Educational Demonstration
(SEED) initiative will serve 200,000 Michigan
students. Two-thirds of the funding should be
reserved for districts with over 50 percent of
students eligible for free or reduced price meals.
(Estimated annual state funding level: $200
million.)
Proposal A should be altered to allow local districts
to request from taxpayers enhancement millages of
up to 3.0 mills per year for a maximum of five years.
These enhancement millages would be used only
for operating (and not capital) expenses. The state
should supplement the millages that are approved
in districts that are relatively poor in property value.
(Estimated annual state funding level: $150 million.)
The state should ensure that its legislatively
mandated adequacy study be rigorous, using
an econometric analysis of cost data as well as
qualitative data from experts concerning what
constitutes best practice in instruction for all
students in all grade levels as well as necessary
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non-instructional activities. These qualitative data
need to be converted to costs in a fully documented
manner. (Estimated total state funding level: $1
million [already in budget].)
The state should increase its funding level and
institute a progressive funding structure for fund aid
for at-risk students (the section 31a categorical).
Michigan’s current extra funding for low-income
students is very low compared to the practices
of states that are outpacing it in educational
achievement gains, and our funding practices need
to change, both to increase overall achievement
and to provide for greater equity in opportunities.
In addition to increasing the at-risk funding level for
the state as a whole, we propose adding a premium
to the per-student allocation of at-risk funds of 0.50
times the percentage of students who are eligible
for free or reduced price lunch. A district with
100 percent low-income students would receive
1.5 times the at-risk funding per pupil as a district
with no low-income students. (Estimated annual
increase in state funding level: $200 million.)
For districts that have declines in enrollment of
more than 2 percent in a year, state aid should
include a declining enrollment adjustment that
equals one-half of the foundation grant times the
net enrollment loss. (Estimated annual state funding
level: $20 million.)
Michigan should alter Proposal A to provide
adjustments to the per-student foundation grant
that weights more heavily enrollments in grades

1–3 and grades 9–12, where costs are higher.
Furthermore, increasing the level of funding for
grades 9–12 will be an incentive to districts to reduce
their high school dropout rates. (Estimated increase
in state funding level: $0.)
We note that we did not attempt to address the funding of
legacy costs, technology, or capital infrastructure in this
study.

Only a Beginning
As we conducted our analyses, it became apparent that
Michigan’s lagging economy has been detrimental to
the state’s educational achievement and limits severely
the state’s ability to improve its K–12 system. The
recommendations we offer are only the first steps on the road
toward excellence.
We believe that successfully traversing that road will require
a unified commitment to excellence by all policymakers,
education practitioners, and citizens. The means will
come from accelerated economic growth over the long
run. Ironically, it will require substantial investments in an
improved education system to achieve that growth.
Our intent is for the ideas and recommendations presented
in this report to spark debate and dialogue among policy
makers, the public, the media, and other stakeholders about
how K–12 funding is raised, how it is allocated, how it is spent,
and how it contributes to academic achievement in our state.

The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan
College Costs: Students
Can’t Afford Not to Know

I: Introduction

M

ichigan is a state in which education has
been accorded high priority by policymakers,
parents, businesses, educational watchdog
organizations, the media, and others; yet
student achievement has been stagnant over the last decade.
Test score measures of student achievement have been flat,
and the gaps between economically disadvantaged students
and other students have widened as compared to other
states. In relative rankings, Michigan has slipped considerably
from the middle to the bottom quintile of states. The slippage
is not a matter of declining levels of achievement in Michigan.
Rather, it is a matter of increasing achievement in other
states, while achievement in this state has stalled.
Michigan’s standing vis-à-vis other states is not just a matter
of state pride. Michigan’s disadvantages relative to the
nation are sufficient to predict future earnings for Michigan
students that are about 2 percent below what they would
be if Michigan’s test scores matched the national average.
Two percent may sound minor, but a 2 percent disadvantage
added up over a career is a significant amount of money.
On average, the present discounted value of a worker’s
earnings over her career exceeds $900,000, so 2 percent
extra earnings would have a present value of over $18,000.7
Applying an $18,000 career earnings boost to each of the
approximately 1.5 million K–12 students in Michigan results
in a potentially huge total state benefit: over $27 billion in
the present value of extra career earnings for this group
of students. Thus there is a large economic stake to even
small improvements in average academic achievement for
Michigan’s students.
It is, of course, the case that student achievement depends
on a host of factors such as student characteristics,

curriculum and instruction, time on task, teacher quality,
and parental and community support. Our study focuses
on the financing of K-12 education in Michigan. Just over 20
years ago, Michigan altered significantly its K–12 funding
mechanism with the passage of Proposal A. This change
has greatly influenced the level and distribution of funding
available to school districts over the years since its passage.
Proposal A addressed funding inequities across districts,
which were one motivation for its passage. However, it has
had some unintended consequences that suggest that it may
be time to consider modifying or replacing it.
The purpose of this study is to take a hard look at Proposal A
and trends in student achievement and education financing
in Michigan relative to other states. It considers whether the
funding mechanism in Michigan may be disadvantageous for
some students and makes recommendations as to how that
funding mechanism can be improved.
The next chapter of this report explains how Proposal A
radically altered the funding of K–12 education in Michigan’s
school districts, reviews studies of the influence of that
funding change on student achievement, documents
statistical analyses undertaken by our research team
concerning the effect of resources on student achievement,
and points out the unintended consequences that were
alluded to above. The state’s imposition of such a substantial
and rapid change in its funding mechanism prompted
several studies as researchers felt that the “exogeneity”
of the change could be used to identify the causal effect
of resources on achievement. That is, Proposal A was a
“natural experiment,” wherein some districts’ educational
spending was increased significantly relative to other
districts because of a sudden state policy change. Whereas

This average considers both workers whose career paths would be unaffected by changes in test scores and workers whose career paths (and earnings) would
be substantially altered by change in these scores. These calculations rely on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) test scores for 2012, the
relationship between test scores and lifetime earnings in Chetty et al. (2011), earnings of all individuals aged 16–80 in the 2012 American Community Survey
(ACS), and a real discount rate of 3.0 percent.
7
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the implementation of Proposal A gave researchers an
opportunity to identify the impact of money on student
achievement, it has also, over the years, been shown to have
shortcomings that should be resolved.
Following the background chapter on Proposal A, the next
chapter of this report examines student achievement in
Michigan and in other states. The cross-state comparisons
use data from the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), which is the only source of information that
can be used for this sort of comparative analyses. In addition,
we use Michigan Educational Assessment Program (MEAP)
data to examine student achievement results in the state.
Since the purpose of the study is to suggest ways that the
funding mechanism in Michigan might be changed in order
to improve student outcomes, it is appropriate to examine
comparable data across states to identify those that are
successful. Using criteria that look at test score levels, trends
over time, and gaps between economically disadvantaged
students and non-economically-disadvantaged students, we
have selected seven exemplary, successful states that may
hold useful lessons for Michiganders.

2

The fourth chapter delves into education financing. It
provides some detail about the mechanisms used in other
states with particular emphases on the exemplary states. An
important part of the chapter is its consideration of the fiscal
capacity of Michigan to provide additional resources. Finally,
it also reviews studies that have shown how school finance
reforms have affected student achievement and other
outcomes.
The final chapter of the report focuses on recommendations
based on our analyses and review of existing evidence. The
details of and rationales for these recommendations are
presented in the last chapter. Our intent is for the ideas and
recommendations presented in this report to spark debate
and dialogue among policymakers, the public, the media,
and other stakeholders about how K–12 funding is raised,
allocated, and spent, and how it contributes to academic
achievement in the state.

The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan
Col-

II: School Financing in Michigan

A

little over two decades ago, Michigan made a
dramatic change in the way that it funded its K–12
educational system. This chapter reviews the
history of the change and discusses studies of the
effects of that change on student achievement. The change
from a system that relied on local funding to one that used
state-funded foundation grants has had positive impacts
on student achievement, according to published studies.
Upjohn Institute staff members replicated these studies with
a longer panel of data, and found results consistent with
the earlier studies. Nevertheless, Proposal A seems to have
resulted in fiscal instability in districts experiencing significant
enrollment changes. The general trend in enrollments
is downward over the past decade, as the state has lost
population. In addition, the financial instability of districts has
been exacerbated by the trends in charter school enrollments
and interdistrict choice programs. Thus, it may be time to
alter the funding mechanism of Proposal A.

A. Proposal A
In March 1993, the Kalkaska School District closed its
doors to students because local voters had voted down
an operating millage for the schools for the third time, and
the district’s school board decided that closing the schools
altogether was its best option. Students were denied almost
three months of education. At commencement on March
28th (instead of the planned end of school in early June), the
senior class president said that he hoped that Kalkaska’s
difficulty would lead to a change in school funding in
Michigan. While school funding inequity may not have been
the primary reason for the change in school funding, the class
president’s wish came true with the passage of Proposal A in
March of the following year.

Prior to the 1994–95 school year, Michigan districts were
funded by local property taxes that were partially equalized
by the state. In the 1993–94 school year, for example, the
state guaranteed districts $102.50 per mill plus fixeddollar payments per pupil of $400.8 In a district whose
property values were quite low, say a state equalized value
(SEV)9 of $80,000 per pupil, a tax rate of 30 mills would
generate $2,400 in local revenue (0.030 × $80,000). Since
the state guaranteed minimum for that district would be
$3,475 ($102.50 × 0.030 + $400), state aid per pupil would
be $1,075 (the difference between the state guaranteed
minimum and local revenue). If a district had much higher
property values, say an SEV of $400,000 per student, and a
30 mill tax rate for schools, then its local revenue per student
would be $12,000. Because the local revenue per pupil
exceeded the state guarantee, such a district would be “out
of formula” and it would receive no state aid.
The problems with this funding formula were that it was
inequitable and that state support could fluctuate within the
budget year. The inequity can be seen in the two districts
described above that have the same tax rate but different
per-pupil revenue, even after state support, of more than
$8,500 ($12,000 − $3,475). The instability in the state
support occurred because the state guaranteed minimum
was based on budget and enrollment estimates, but the
actual levels paid out depended on realized enrollments, local
millage rates, and SEVs that could change during the year. If
such changes led to total state aid exceeding the budgeted
amount, state aid would be adjusted downward in order for
the budget to balance, disproportionately cutting payments
to poorer districts.
Under this system, the state provided 37 percent of the
combined local and state funding for K–12 education in

The $400 was composed of a flat grant of $326 per pupil, plus $74 in incentive payments.
A property’s SEV is equal to one-half of its assessed value.
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Table 2-1. Proposal A Parameters and Gap between Michigan’s Maximum
Funded District and Its Minimum Funded District, by Year
Effective Basic

Growth in

Hold Harmless

Growth in

District

District Maximum

Fiscal Year

Minimum

Effective Basic

(HH) Threshold

HH Threshold

Maximum

Minus District Minimum

1993–94

$2,762

n/a

$10,294

$7,532

n/a

n/a

1994–95

a

4,200

n/a

6,500

n/a

10,454

6,254

1995–96

4,506a

306

6,653

153

10,607

6,101

1996–97

a

4,816

310

6,808

155

10,762

5,946

1997–98

5,124a

308

6,962

154

10,916

5,792

1998–99

5,170

46

6,962

0

10,916

5,746

1999–00

5,700

430

7,200

238

11,154

5,454

2000–01

6,000

300

7,500

300

11,454

5,454

2001–02

6,500

500

7,800

300

11,754

5,254

a

2002–03

6,700 (pro-rated to 6,626)

200

8,000

200

11,880

5,254

2003–04

6,700 (pro-rated to 6,626)

0

8,000

0

11,880

5,254

2004–05

6,700

0

8,000

0

11,954

5,254

2005–06

6,875

175

8,175

175

12,129

5,254

2006–07

7,108

233

8,385

210

12,339

5,231

2007–08

7,204

96

8,433

48

12,387

5,183

2008–09

7,316

112

8,489

56

12,443

5,127

2009–10

7,316 (cut to 7,162)

0

8,489

0

12,170b

5,008

2010–11

7,316 (cut to 7,146)

0

8,489

0

12,154

5,008

2011–12

6,846

(470)

8,019

(470)

11,854

5,008

2012–13

6,966

120

8,019

0

11,854

4,888

2013–14

7,076

110

8,049

30

11,884

4,808

2014–15

7,251

175

8,099

50

11,934

4,733

NOTE: The 1993–94 fiscal year is pre-Proposal A. The district maximum column is the state revenue for Bloomfield Hills, which is the highest
per-pupil-funded district with at least 10 enrolled students. At various times, fixed per-pupil equity payments were built into the basic level: a $200
payment was instituted in FY 2001–02, a $23 payment was added in FY 2006–07, and a $125 payment was added in FY 2014–15. There have also
occasionally been mid-year cuts during budgetary shortfalls: in FY 2002–03 and FY 2003–04, state aid payments were cut by $74 per pupil in all
districts without any alteration to the statutory minimum or threshold; and in FY 2009–10 and FY 2010–11, there were analogous reductions in state
aid of $154 and $170, respectively. All entries are in nominal dollars.
a
During the first five years of Proposal A implementation, the state had separate “effective minimum” and “effective basic” levels of funding. These
figures are the former and are the amounts actually used. The “effective basic” started at a value of $5,000 in 1994–95, which was felt to be the
desirable minimum support, but presumably would have required an infeasible level of state support. The two concepts were unified starting with SFY
1999.
b
Section 20j categorical veto is built into this figure.

SOURCE: Senate Fiscal Agency, 2014a.
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Michigan. In the 1994–95 school year, with Proposal A, the
state funding mechanism drastically changed to a foundation
grant system. With the enactment of Proposal A, the state’s
share of combined state and local funding rose dramatically
to 80 percent. Under the foundation grant system, the state
effectively sets two levels of operational funding per pupil: a
guaranteed minimum, called the effective basic foundation
grant, and a maximum level of support, called the hold
harmless threshold (or basic)10 level.
The foundation allowance for a district may be at the
guaranteed minimum (where most districts are), may be
between the minimum and the hold harmless threshold
level, or may be greater than the threshold. From year to
year, districts at the minimum level all receive the same
increase (or decrease), which is the change in the guaranteed
minimum set by the state. Districts with funding that is
greater than the basic (threshold) level all receive the same
increase (or decrease), which is the change in the threshold
level (this change is always less than or equal to the change
in the minimum). Districts in between the two levels receive
a pro-rated change level that is between the change in the
minimum and the threshold. The intent of Proposal A is to
reduce the disparity in the levels of funding per pupil across
districts by increasing the basic foundation grant faster than
the maximum support level, so that eventually all districts
would be equalized or close to equalized, and there would be
no local hold harmless millages.
State funding comes from a variety of revenue sources, but
mainly from a substantial portion of the state sales tax, a
portion of the state income tax, the real estate transfer tax,
and a 6.0 mill education property tax. Local funding mainly
comes from two sources. Districts may levy up to 18.0
mills (over and above the 6.0 state millage rate) on nonhomestead property with voter approval; and if districts have
had historically high levels of revenue per pupil, they may levy
a hold harmless millage on homestead and non-homestead
property, again with voter approval. Local funding may also

be raised through an enhancement
millage of up to 3.0 mills that must
be approved by voters in the district’s
intermediate school district.
Table 2-1 on the previous page shows the statutory changes
in the effective basic, hold harmless threshold, and maximum
district levels of funding in the year prior to the passage of
Proposal A and over the years since it was implemented. The
final column in the table shows the maximum funding gap in
the state. Note that the change in the threshold, or maximum
support, level is always equal to or less than the change in
the effective basic grant, or minimum support level. The
funding gap that is displayed in the final column of the table,
which is a measure of the improvement in equity among
districts, steadily decreases from over $7,500 in the year
immediately before Proposal A to $4,733 in the current fiscal
year. After an immediate decrease in this gap of $1,278 in the
year that Proposal A was implemented, the gap has gradually
narrowed by another $1,521, or about 25 percent, over the
intervening 21 years.
Table 2-2 on Page 6 adjusts the funding levels displayed in
Table 2-1 for inflation. The entries in that table show that
districts that just receive the basic foundation grant have
in recent years received per-pupil funding that is almost
precisely the same, in inflation-adjusted dollars, as the
funding in 1996–97. However in the intervening years, the
effective basic funding in real dollars increased by over
20 percent before falling back to its earlier level. Districts
whose funding levels were at or near the state’s maximum
foundation grant (at the hold harmless threshold level) have
seen the state per-pupil support fall by approximately 20
percent in real terms over the past 20 years. In real terms,
the gap between the maximum and minimum district perpupil funding has decreased significantly. It dropped by 19.1
percent in the first year that Proposal A was implemented,
and then it fell by about 52 percent over the succeeding 21
years.

The word “basic” is used to mean two different concepts. The minimum foundation grant is referred to as the Effective Basic grant (see Senate Fiscal Agency
2014a), and the threshold level is called the Basic grant (see Senate Fiscal Agency 2014b).
10
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Table 2-2. Proposal A Parameters and Gap between Michigan’s Maximum
Funded District and Its Minimum Funded District, in Real Dollars, by Year
Effective Basic

Growth in

Hold Harmless

Growth in

District

District Maximum Minus

Fiscal Year

Minimum

Effective Basic

(HH)Threshold

HH Threshold

Maximum

District Minimum

1993–94

$4,448

n/a

n/a

n/a

$16,578

$12,130

1994–95

6,588

n/a

10,195

n/a

16,397

9,809

1995–96

6,893

305

10,177

(18)

16,225

9,332

1996–97

7,130

237

10,079

(98)

15,933

8,803

1997–98

7,459

329

10,134

55

15,890

8,431

1998–99

7,406

(53)

9,974

(160)

15,638

8,232

1999–00

7,952

546

10,045

71

15,561

7,609

2000–01

8,097

145

10,121

76

15,456

7,360

2001–02

8,637

540

10,365

244

15,619

6,982

2002–03

8,696 (pro-rated to 8,600)

59

10,384

19

15,420

6,820

2003–04

8,536 (pro-rated to 8,442)

(160)

10,192

(192)

15,135

6,693

2004–05

8,267

(269)

9,871

(321)

14,749

6,482

2005–06

8,202

(65)

9,754

(117)

14,471

6,268

2006–07

8,270

68

9,756

2

14,357

6,086

2007–08

8,055

(215)

9,429

(327)

13,850

5,795

2008–09

8,168

113

9,478

49

13,892

5,724

2009–10

7,956 (cut to 7,789)

(212)

9,232

(246)

13,235

5,446

2010–11

7,837 (cut to 7,655)

(119)

9,093

(139)

13,019

5,364

2011–12

7,122

(715)

8,342

(751)

12,332

5,210

2012–13

7,124

2

8,201

(141)

12,122

4,998

2013–14

7,131

7

8,111

(90)

11,975

4,844

2014–15

7,251

120

8,099

(12)

11,934

4,733

NOTE: Table entries are from Table 2-1 converted to 2014-15 dollars, using CPI-U.
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B. Impact of Proposal A on Student
Achievement
Proposal A was not promulgated as a school improvement
initiative, per se. It did not have any regulations, incentives,
or sanctions directed at teaching and learning. It was mainly
intended to provide property tax relief and improved perpupil funding equity. Of course, in accomplishing the latter,
it produced relative “gainers” and “losers,” as some districts
gained greater increases in state support than others. To the
extent that student achievement depends on funding levels,
we would expect that Proposal A would disproportionately
benefit student achievement in “gainer” districts.
Papke (2005) carried out the first analysis that used Proposal
A to estimate the effect of spending changes on student
achievement, and therefore to indirectly identify the effects of
Proposal A on student achievement. Using school-level data
from the MEAP for 4th grade mathematics over the sevenyear period from 1991–92 to 1997–98, Papke estimated the
impact of spending on passing the test — scoring above the
cut score, i.e., receiving a satisfactory. Her results suggest
that for each $1,000 increase in per-pupil spending, the
4th grade math passing rate increased by between 2.2 and
3.7 percentage points. When she looked at schools in lower
spending districts that received relatively more funding
after the implementation of Proposal A, the increase was
between 3.2 and 10.3 percentage points. In contrast, schools
in historically higher spending districts experienced passing
rates that rose between 1.3 and 2.6 percentage points. Over
the period, the MEAP passing rates went up for all schools,
on average, but the lower spending districts’ schools were the
relative “gainers.”
In a subsequent paper, Papke (2008) uses a longer panel of
data, both pre- and post-Proposal A, to attempt to replicate
her earlier results. Even though the per-pupil funding
equalization slowed in the early 2000s, the author finds it
was still the case that the impact of higher levels of resources
was more than three times as great for lower-spending
districts as for higher-spending districts.
11

Roy (2011) also examines the impact
of Proposal A on academic achievement.
He focuses on two aspects of Proposal A: the
relative increase in per-pupil revenue in lower-spending
districts and the loss of significant local control over revenue
(and thus spending) of all districts because of the imposition
of state decision making. Similar to Papke, he hypothesized
that districts with larger increases in revenue as a result
of Proposal A would exhibit gains in student achievement
relative to initially higher-spending districts. But in
addition, he hypothesized that the lack of local discretion in
spending increases would have a negative effect on student
performance in higher-spending districts.
Using 4th grade MEAP data from 1990 through 2001 for
reading and mathematics, Roy (2011) employs a cohort
analysis to empirically confirm that passing rates in the
lowest-spending districts increased faster than those in
higher-spending districts. Applying an instrumental variable
approach to establish causality, he finds an increase in
the passing rate on the reading test of between 3 and
6 percentage points for every $1,000 in additional perpupil revenue. This translates to an effect size of between
0.20 and 0.40 standard deviations. For mathematics, the
results are slightly stronger: an increase of between 6 and 8
percentage points for every $1,000 in additional per-pupil
revenue, or an effect size of between 0.40 and 0.55 standard
deviations. These results suggest that during the years
1994–95 through 1998–99, the districts that received the
basic foundation grant — which increased by $970 over the
period — had increases in 4th grade MEAP passing rates
of between 3 and 6 points for reading and between 6 and 8
points for math. Districts during those years that received
the state maximum grant — which increased by only $462 —
had increases of half the magnitude, leading to a narrowing
of the achievement gap across districts.11
Roy is much more circumspect about his second hypothesis.
In this case, he suggests that the deterioration in MEAP
results of districts in the highest quintile of spending relative

However, he found no statistically significant impact of changes in per-pupil spending on ACT-taking rates or ACT scores.
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to all other districts may result from less control over revenue
in the years after the implementation of Proposal A.

C. Further Analyses of Proposal A
The studies that look at the impact of Proposal A on student
achievement suggest that resources matter. The districts
that received the largest increases in funding had the largest
increases in student achievement. From a social science
perspective, Proposal A can be viewed as a good “natural
experiment” to see what happens when a state makes
large and variable changes in real revenue per pupil across
different school districts. The reform effectively increased
revenue per pupil in many school districts, particularly lowerincome rural school districts, and these districts showed
greater improvements in academic performance.

We have replicated and extended the analyses of Papke
(2005, 2008) and Roy (2011). Figure 2-1 shows the estimated
relationship among Michigan school districts between the
20-year change in real state and local revenue per pupil
from 1993 (just before Proposal A) to 2013 and the change
in the passing rate on the MEAP test. The regression line
shown in the figure indicates a statistically significant
positive relationship between the two changes. In particular,
the slope of the line suggests that a district’s passing rate
on the MEAP increases about 1.5 percentage points when
its (inflation-adjusted) per-pupil revenue rises by $1,000.
(Adding additional control variables to the regression reduces
the slope to about 1.2 percentage points, but it remains
statistically significant.)

−10
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Figure 2-1. Change in Average MEAP Passing Rate Between 1993 and 2013,
by Change in Real State and Local Revenue per Pupil

−4000

−2000
Change in Revenue
Fitted values

8

0

Change in MEAP

2000

NOTE: Each point is a Michigan
school district. The horizontal
axis shows the change in real
state and local general funding
per pupil between 1993, just
before Proposal A, and 2013.
The vertical axis shows the
change in the average MEAP
passage rate over all the
reading and math MEAP tests
given in that district. Without
controls, the regression line has
an estimated coefficient of 1.46
(t-statistic of 4.44) per $1,000
dollar change in per-pupil
funding. Controlling for the
change in the share of students
in a district who are low
income lowers the coefficient
slightly to 1.33 (t-stat = 4.29).
Additionally controlling for the
initial period’s funding level and
MEAP pass rate further lowers
the coefficient to 1.16 (t-stat =
2.95).
SOURCE: Michigan Educational
Assessment Program (MEAP).
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Later in this document, we use these results to extrapolate
the amount of additional resources that it would take to
upgrade Michigan’s student achievement to the level of
the U.S. average and to the level of exemplary states, as
well as the resources it would take to reduce gaps between
disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students. These
extrapolations assume that the status quo delivery of
teaching and learning (i.e., classroom productivity) is
unchanged. An emphasis of our study is that more resources
are needed and that any additional resources invested in the
system should be used on interventions or strategies that
have been shown to be effective.

D. If Student Achievement Generally Rose with
Proposal A, What’s Not to Love?
School districts (charter and traditional) are private nonprofit
or public entities. As such, they are not intended to make
a profit, nor can they sustain large or long-lasting losses. It
is important, then, that changes in costs from year to year
(i.e., marginal costs) get approximately balanced by changes
in revenue (marginal revenue). A single foundation grant
system, such as that imposed by Proposal A, is inflexible by
design. The inflexibility of the Proposal A mechanism tends
to hurt very rapidly growing school districts (traditional
or charter) and districts that are experiencing declining
enrollment. In the former case, the per-student cost of
expansion is likely to exceed the foundation grant. In the
latter case, the cost reduction is likely to be less than the
reduction in revenue.
Unfortunately, several events have stressed the financial
status of many districts: state fiscal distress that caused
a rollback in the foundation grant level and categorical
supports, declining student enrollment in the state, and an
increased number of districts. As noted in Table 2-1, after
fairly steady growth in the foundation grant between 1994
and 2008 (with the exception of two temporary cuts in the
early 2000s), the foundation grant was reduced by $470
per student between the 2008–09 school year and the
2011–12 school year. Despite growing state revenues, the
current foundation grant in nominal terms is less than it was

in the 2008–09 year. Furthermore,
a categorical source of funding for
districts that were being held harmless,
section 20(j), was vetoed in 2009 and has not been
reinstituted. With these cuts in per-pupil revenue, districts
have had to cut expenses in order to maintain their fiscal
balance.
If we adjust for inflation, the recent financial trends for
Michigan schools are much more unfavorable. For example,
in Table 2-1, from the 2008–09 school year to the 2014–15
school year, the effective basic minimum foundation grant
declined in nominal terms, without adjusting for inflation,
from $7,316 per student in 2008-09 to $7,251 per student
in 2014-15. In nominal terms, this is a decline of only 0.9
percent. If we adjust for increasing prices, Table 2-2 shows
that the $7,316 per student in 2008–09 would be equivalent
to $8,168 in 2014-15 dollars. The actual $7,251 per student
in 2014–15 then represents an 11.2 percent decline in real
resources per student. Inflation in costs is a reality that
districts have to deal with — costs of buying inputs such
as fuel for buses or textbooks or other supplies go up with
inflation, and schools face pressures for wages to keep pace
with inflation in order to stay competitive in the labor market.
Unfortunately, Kalkaska-like situations are arising again
in Michigan, as two districts closed their doors due to
insolvency in 2013, and more than 50 others are close to
bankruptcy (Michigan Department of Education 2014).
Clearly, Proposal A has not prevented fiscal distress in
Michigan’s school districts. The problem is mainly the
vicious circle created by declining enrollment. This vicious
circle comprises the cycle of enrollment losses causing
revenue losses, which necessitate program cuts that impair
educational quality, that precipitate further enrollment
losses.
The primary source of revenue for districts is state and
local aid that is essentially composed of the foundation
grant multiplied by student enrollment. Not only has the
foundation grant been declining, but for most districts,
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student enrollment has also been declining. In the 2002–03
come from a reduction in materials and possibly from less
school year, the state’s K–12 enrollment was over 1.71 million
time spent with individual students. In short, the costs in
students. It declined to 1.52 million in 2013–14 (an 11 percent
producing K–12 education are “lumpy.”
decrease), and it is projected to decline to 1.50 million by
2015–16. If the number of districts in Michigan had remained Average expenditures per student may also vary
constant, then this overall drop in enrollment would have
substantially because of the mix of students in the district.
meant that the typical district’s enrollment dropped by about Students from poverty backgrounds often require smaller
11 percent between 2002 and 2014. However, mainly because class sizes, mentors, more time on task, or other costly
of the growth in public charter schools, the effective number
interventions in order to succeed. Michigan authorizes
of districts has increased considerably, raising the costs of
additional spending to supplement the foundation grant for
overhead and administration. More than three-fourths of
at-risk students under section 31a of the State School Aid
the traditional school districts that existed in the
Act.12 However, in the current fiscal year, the level
2002–03 school year have experienced
of assistance is around $600 per eligible
losses in enrollment; almost one-fourth
student, much less than supplements
of them have shrunk by at least 25
in other states. (The executive
More
than
threepercent.
budget that has been presented
to the Michigan legislature
fourths of the traditional
As cogently presented in
increases this categorical
school districts that existed in
Citizens Research Council
by about $180 per eligible
(CRC) (2015), declining
student for the next fiscal
the 2002–03 school year have
enrollment is a significant
year.) English language
problem for districts
learners also require costly
experienced losses in enrollment;
because the foundation
interventions relative to
grant that is lost exceeds the
other students in order to
almost one-fourth of them
marginal cost of educating
succeed. If these students are
have shrunk by at least
one student. In other words,
not eligible for at-risk funding,
a loss of enrollment typically
then these costs must be borne
25 percent.
decreases costs only slightly,
by the district.
whereas the forfeited foundation grant
revenue from losing a student is relatively
Another differential is the cost of delivering
substantial. If a few students leave a district,
instruction by grade level. Best practice for
they will most likely come from several different classroom or early elementary grades calls for smaller class sizes, which
schools. Class sizes may be slightly smaller, but the district
imply more teachers and thus higher costs per student,
is likely to have the same number of classrooms and schools, holding other things equal. Furthermore, some subjects in
and, of course, the same number of teachers and building
the secondary grades — for instance, arts, sciences (lab
administrators. If there are any cost savings, they would
courses), or career and technical education — may require

“At-risk” students, according to Michigan, are students who have low achievement on state or local assessments in core subject areas; do not meet proficiency
standards in reading by the end of 3rd grade; do not meet career or college readiness at the end of 12th grade; are victims of child abuse or neglect; are pregnant
teenagers or teenage parents; have a family history of school failure, incarceration or substance abuse; are pupils in a priority or priority successor school; or at
least two out of the following seven criteria: 1) eligible for free breakfast, lunch, or milk; 2) excessively absent; 3) homeless; 4) migrant; 5) English language learner;
6) immigrant within last three years; or 7) did not complete high school in four years.
12
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materials and equipment, which make them more expensive
on a per-student basis. Thus, districts with disproportionately
greater enrollment in early elementary grades or in high
school grades will have higher per-student costs.

the latter districts are spending
around $350 of their foundation grants
on transportation, whereas some other
districts are spending $0.

Other important differentials in cost that vary across districts
are regional cost/price differentials and the amount of
transportation provided by districts. Edgar Olsen, of the
University of Virginia, has constructed a data series that
provides cost of living estimates for urban areas in the
U.S.13 To give a sense of the variation in Michigan, we use
the estimates from Olsen’s website14 for Ann Arbor, Benton
Harbor, Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, and Kalamazoo. Using
Kalamazoo as a baseline with an index of 100, the 2012 CPI
estimates for Ann Arbor, Benton Harbor, Detroit, Flint, and
Grand Rapids would be 108.1, 99.5, 102.9, 97.4, and 105.8,
respectively. Just using these data for cities, we find a cost of
living differential of 11 percent between Flint and Ann Arbor —
two cities that are relatively close to each other.15

In short, Michigan’s financing mechanism poorly addresses
well-known and well-recognized cost differentials: atrisk students, declining enrollments, instructional cost
differences by grade level, regional cost/price variation, and
transportation needs.

Districts also vary considerably by geographic size, and
consequently by transportation costs. Most charter school
districts and some urban districts spend nothing on
transportation. Many rural or small-city districts spend up to
5 percent of their budget on transportation. Thus, on average,

Finally, Michigan has always prided itself on its adherence
to local control, but Proposal A does not allow localities to
exercise their preference for educational quality, except for
rarely passed intermediate school district supplements.

In addition to its deficiencies with respect to operational
costs, the Proposal A financing mechanism does not address
at all the costs of capital improvements and infrastructure
costs. Traditional districts must use millages and thus
depend on property values for major capital or infrastructure
improvements. Charter schools do not have the opportunity
to ask voters for millages, and so they must use their
foundation grants or loans.

Olsen’s series are considered quite reliable and have been used in a number of academic publications that have undergone peer review. See, for example, Olsen
(2012) and Olsen and Early (2012).
14
http://eoolsen.weebly.com/price-indices.html, accessed 05/12/2015.
15
Note that we do not recommend adjusting the foundation grant for regional cost differentials in this study. We are concerned about the extent to which housing
cost differentials “drive” the regional cost of living differentials. Housing costs are likely to be low in disadvantaged communities such as Benton Harbor or Detroit,
which arguably may need higher foundation grants, and are likely to be high in wealthier communities such as Ann Arbor. Furthermore, communities with high
housing costs are also likely to have hold harmless millages.
13
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III: Student Achievement in Michigan

T

his chapter examines student achievement as a
prelude for a detailed examination of finances in
the ensuing chapter. If there were no concerns
about Michigan’s student achievement, there
would be little need to consider altering the finance
mechanism at all. However, as this chapter demonstrates,
apprehension about student achievement in Michigan is well
placed.
The first section of the chapter examines trends in student
academic achievement in Michigan relative to the national
average. Using National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) data, which are available for all states, and statistics
on high school graduation and dropout rates, the picture
drawn of Michigan is one of decline relative to the nation
as a whole. The next section of the chapter turns to an
analysis of achievement by Michigan’s vulnerable students,
identified in this study as qualifying for the federal school
lunch program.16 In this section, we analyze the student
achievement of low-income and non-low-income students in
Michigan and in all other states. We identify seven exemplary
states that we use as “benchmarks” for Michigan. The last
section of the chapter identifies the detrimental effects on
student achievement for both low-income and non-lowincome students of attending schools in districts with high
percentages of students eligible for the free lunch program.

A. Michigan’s Academic Performance
over Time
NAEP, also known as the nation’s report card, is the
only nationally representative assessment of student

achievement that can be used to compare states. NAEP
assesses 4th, 8th, and 12th graders in different subjects at
different frequencies. Assessments of mathematics and
reading are given most often, generally biennially.
Figure 3-1 shows the trend over the past two decades in
NAEP math score results for Michigan and for the U.S. as a
whole for 4th and 8th graders. The figure shows the mean
scale score results for both grades on a common scale.
Before 2000, the average test scores for both grades in
Michigan exceed that of the U.S. average. After 2000, the
pattern reverses — the U.S. average scores exceed the
Michigan average scores, and the differences slowly increase.
Figure 3-2 shows the NAEP results for reading. In this case,
the 8th grade reading results are available for Michigan only
since 2002. With the exception of the 2013 4th grade means,
the averages for the U.S. and for Michigan are much closer
to each other than the math assessment means. However,
it is worth noting that again the U.S. means are greater than
or equal to the Michigan means continuously for years since
2005.
Besides test scores, two other metrics related to student
achievement are the high school completion rate and the
high school dropout rate. Measures of these rates can be
found in the Common Core Data system of the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The event dropout
rate is defined as the percentage of high school students
who left high school between the beginning of one school
year and the beginning of the next without earning a high

The National School Lunch Program is a federally assisted meal program operating in public and nonprofit private schools and residential child care institutions.
It provides nutritionally balanced, low-cost, or free lunches to children each school day. The program was established under the National School Lunch Act, signed
by President Harry Truman in 1946. Students whose families earn less than 130 percent of the federal poverty level are eligible for free lunches, and those from
families with incomes greater than 130 percent and less than 185 percent qualify for reduced price lunches. The current federal poverty guidelines place a family
of four earning $31,525 at 130 percent of the poverty level and a family of four earning $44,823 at 185 percent of the poverty level. For those in Alaska and Hawaii,
the income levels are slightly higher.
16
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Figure 3-1. Michigan and U.S. Math Scores on NAEP, by Year
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Figure 3-2. Michigan and U.S. Reading Scores on NAEP, by Year
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school diploma or an alternative credential such as a GED.17
The average freshman graduation rate in an academic year
is calculated as the number of high school diplomas awarded
during that year divided by the arithmetic average of the 8th,
9th, and 10th grade enrollments in four, three, and two years
prior to the academic year, respectively.

increased as much as the national
average, leading to a wider gap in
graduation rates between Michigan and the
national average.

Table 3-1 shows the event dropout rate and the average
freshman graduation rate for public high school students
in both Michigan and the U.S. For 7 of the 10 years shown in
Table 3-1, the event dropout rates are higher for Michigan
than for the national average, and the graduation rates for

As Michigan traverses the road toward K–12 excellence, the
education and achievement of its most vulnerable students
must be addressed. These children are from low-income
families with fewer resources at home than more affluent
families to help their children succeed in school. In this study,

B. Achievement of Vulnerable, Low-Income
Students

Table 3-1. Michigan and U.S. Dropout and Graduation Rates, by Year
Academic Year
2002–03

Event Dropout Rate		
Michigan
U.S.
4.5

Gap

3.9

+0.6

Average Freshman Graduation Rate
Michigan
U.S.

Gap

74.0

73.9

+0.1

2003–04

4.6

4.1

+0.5

72.5

75.0

-2.5

2004–05

3.9

3.9

0.0

73.0

74.7

-1.7

2005–06

3.5

3.9

-0.4

72.2

73.2

-1.0

2006–07

7.4

4.4

+3.0

77.0

73.9

+3.1

2007–08

6.2

4.1

+2.1

76.3

74.9

+2.4

2008–09

3.8

4.1

-0.3

75.3

75.5

-0.2

2009–10

4.3

3.4

+1.0

75.9

78.2

-2.3

2010–1 1

7.2

3.3

+3.9

75.0

80.0

-5.0

201 1–12

6.9

3.3

+3.6

77.0

81.0

-4.0

SOURCE: Chapman et al (2011); Stillwell and Sable (2013); Stetser and Stillwell (2014).

Michigan are lower than the national average. The average
freshman graduation rates for Michigan are close to the
U.S. average over this time period, but they have lagged
considerably more since the advent of the Great Recession.
Michigan’s graduation rates are slightly higher during the
last three years than in the first three years but have not

we follow the common practice of identifying these students
as those students who qualify for the federal student lunch
program. Using a student achievement index developed from
the NAEP scores, the data in Table 3-2 indicate that Michigan
is modestly below the U.S. average in test scores for both
low-income and non-low-income students. The entries in the

The event dropout rate is not an ideal measure of students who leave high school without a credential, as it will count as dropouts students who transfer to
another public school district, private school, or state- or district-approved alternative education program; students with a temporary absence due to suspension
or school-approved education program; or deceased students. Nonetheless, it is straightforward to calculate for most districts and is readily historically available.
17
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Table 3-2. Michigan vs. U.S. Test Score Indices: 2013 Levels and 2003–13 Changes
2013 Test Score Index
			Low-Income
Non-Low-Income
			
Students
Students

2003–13 Difference
Low-Income
Non-Low-Income
Students
Students

Michigan

237.3

262.9

6.0

5.2

United States

240.3

266.3

8.0

8.5

NOTE: Test score index is the simple average of scale scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress for 4th grade and 8th grade reading
and math. The 2003–13 difference is the change from 2003 to 2013 in this test score index.
SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).

table correspond to an index that combines NAEP math and
reading test score results for grades 4 and 8. In 2013, there
is a 3.0 point gap for low-income students and 3.4 point gap
for non-low-income students between Michigan and the U.S.
state average. The change in this index between the years
2003 and 2013 for Michigan trailed the change in the national
average by 2.0 points for low-income students and 3.3 points
for non-low-income students. The fact that the changes in
Michigan are positive, but have lagged behind the changes
for the U.S. state average, implies that Michigan’s academic
achievement as measured by these tests has increased over
the last decade, but at a slower rate than the U.S. average for
both low-income and non-low-income students.18
One way to understand the significance of the differences
in student achievement between students from low-income
families and those who are not is to estimate the effect on
future earnings. The test score gap for low-income students
in Michigan or in the U.S. as a whole shown in Table 3-2
suggests that the typical low-income student would have
future earnings that are 18 percent lower than non-lowincome students, a differential that becomes quite large
over an entire career. The test score gaps of 25.6 points

for Michigan and 26.0 points for the U.S. are around threequarters of a standard deviation. In percentile terms, lowincome students in Michigan (U.S.) are at the 31.4 percentile
(34.5 percentile), and non-low-income students are at the
59.8 percentile (63.5 percentile). Drawing upon Chetty et
al.’s (2011) findings that a 1 percentile change in test scores
at grades 4 and 8 predicts adult earnings differentials
of 0.642 percent at the overall adult earnings mean, the
28.4-percentile disadvantage for low-income students in
Michigan (29.0 for the U.S.) would be expected to cause
an earnings differential of about 18 percent (28.4 × 0.642 ≈
18). Since the overall expected earnings differential between
children from low-income families and non-low-income
families is around 59 percent when evaluated at the overall
earnings mean (Bartik 2014), these test score differentials
alone can account for about 30 percent (18 ÷ 59) of the
overall earnings disadvantage of low-income families.
Comparing individual MEAP test scores within the state of
Michigan (rather than state-level NAEP scores) for lowincome students and non-low-income students gives similar
results. Differences in average reading and math test scores
from 3rd through 8th grade between low-income students

In this and ensuing sections, we focus on the gaps in educational outcomes (as proxied by test scores) between low-income and non-low-income students. The
definition of low-income is eligibility for free or reduced price lunch. These gaps are pervasive and economically significant, as documented below.
19
The average scale score differential between low-income and non-low-income students over reading and math MEAP tests in grades 3 through 8 in 2013 was
20.25 points. As the MEAP is designed to have a standard deviation of 25 scale points, the differential corresponds to 0.81 standard deviations. In percentile
terms, the average low-income student scores at the 33.6 percentile of the overall test score distribution, while the average non-low-income student scores at the
65.0 percentile. This 31.4 percentile differential would be predicted, based on Chetty et al.’s (2011) results, to yield a 20 percent earnings differential, where the
percentage is relative to the overall mean of earnings.
18
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Table 3-3. Ranking of States on NAEP Academic Performance Index
								Index of State Academic Performance,

Rank				
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

State 		

New Jersey
Massachusetts
Maryland
Florida
Pennsylvania
New Hampshire
Indiana
Georgia
Vermont
Washington
Colorado
District of Columbia
Minnesota
Tennessee
Hawaii
Wyoming
Nevada
North Carolina
Texas
Maine
Rhode Island
Ohio
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Delaware
Kansas
Idaho
Montana
Arkansas
Oregon
Utah
Nebraska
Arizona
California
Virginia
Connecticut
Missouri
Illinois
Iowa
North Dakota
New York
New Mexico
Alabama
Oklahoma
Michigan
Louisiana
Mississippi
West Virginia
South Carolina
South Dakota
Alaska

2013 Levels and 2003–13 Changes
1.29
1.24
1.21
0.86
0.86
0.83
0.80
0.58
0.54
0.46
0.43
0.43
0.40
0.35
0.34
0.25
0.24
0.19
0.19
0.15
0.11
0.09
0.08
0.03
0.02
0.00
−0.03
−0.06
−0.10
−0.13
−0.16
−0.21
−0.24
−0.27
−0.28
−0.33
−0.34
−0.36
−0.45
−0.51
−0.54
−0.55
−0.61
−0.62
−0.64
−0.84
−0.89
−1.03
−1.06
−1.07
−1.07

NOTE: The index is calculated using four inputs for each state: 1) the simple mean of average test score levels for low-income students in 2013 for 4th graders and 8th
graders in reading and math; 2) the same simple mean of average test score levels but for non-low-income students; 3) the simple mean of average test score changes
between 2003 and 2013 for low-income students, again for 4th and 8th graders in reading and math; and 4) this same simple mean of average test score changes for
non-low-income students. Each of these inputs is expressed in standard deviation units relative to the national mean, where the standard deviation is across the 51 state
observations of each input. The index then calculates a weighted average of these four inputs, with a double weight put on the test score levels and trends of low-income
students. An equally weighted average yields similar rankings. SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).
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Table 3-4. Michigan vs. Leading States’ Test Score Indices: 2013 Levels and 2003–13 Changes
2013 Test Score Index
2003–13 Trends
				Low-Income
Non-Low-Income		Low-Income
Non-Low-Income
				
Students
Students
Students
Students
Michigan

237.3

262.9

6.0

5.2

New Jersey

245.5

272.3

14.5

10.8

Massachusetts

247.6

277.3

10.7

12.4

Maryland

243.5

270.3

15.5

13.5

Florida

244.8

267.0

12.8

10.2

Pennsylvania

243.5

269.0

13.0

10.0

New Hampshire

248.3

269.0

8.8

8.5

Indiana

246.5

267.5

10.5

9.0

NOTE: Same sources as Table 3-2.

and non-low-income students predict an earnings gap of
about 20 percent.19
To provide a more comprehensive index of student
achievement across states, we developed an index based on
the four tests in 2013 and the change in test scores between
2003 and 2013 for both low-income and non-low-income
students. With this index, New Jersey and Massachusetts are
clearly at the top of the list of states, as shown in Table 3-3,
joined by Maryland. After that, there is a large gap in the index
between Maryland and Florida, but indices for the next four
states — Florida, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Indiana
— are close in value.
Michigan ranks 45th out of the 50 states and District of
Columbia. This low ranking is attributable to Michigan scoring
below almost all of the other states in test score levels or in test
score changes, or — compared with leading states —both.
The seven top ranking states in the table, our “exemplary”
benchmark states, have values of our constructed index
that are well above all of the other states. Table 3-4 shows
the same test score levels and changes for low-income and
non-low-income students that are displayed in Table 3-2 for
Michigan and for the U.S. average, but in this case the table

18

shows data for Michigan and for those seven top ranking
states. Note that Michigan is well behind these seven states in
each of the four columns of the table.
How do Michigan’s test score differentials across income
groups compare to other states? Almost every state has
large test score differentials between low-income students
and non-low-income students. In the NAEP score index we
have constructed, every state has scores for low-income
students that average at least 16 percentiles lower than the
scores for non-low-income students, and 40 of the 50 states
(plus the District of Columbia) have test score differentials
of at least 23 percentiles. Michigan’s test score differential of
28.4 percentiles is slightly below the U.S. average differential
of 29 percentiles.
States differ greatly in their overall academic performance,
but if a state does better than the average state, it tends to do
uniformly better for both low-income students and non-lowincome students, and if it does worse than the average state,
it does worse for both income groups. Figure 3-3 shows the
relationship between the average NAEP test score index for
low-income students and non-low-income students by state.
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Figure 3-3. Comparison of Non-Low-Income and Low-Income Test Score Levels
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NOTE:Each point represents a state (including DC), and the red circle represents the U.S. average. The horizontal axis is the average NAEP 2013
reading and math scores for 4th and 8th grade for non-low-income students; the vertical axis is the same for low-income students. Michigan,
Massachusetts, DC, and the U.S. average are identified as data points. SOURCE: National Assesment of Educational Progress (NAEP).

With the exception of one outlier, the District of Columbia,
which has unusually high scores for non-low-income
students relative to low-income students, the relationship
is quite strong, with a correlation of 0.62. Even including the
District of Columbia, the correlation between this NAEP test
score index for low-income and non-low-income students is
0.52 and highly statistically significant.
However, Figure 3-3 shows that Michigan falls below the
national average of test scores for both low-income students
and non-low-income students. It is accompanied by 10 other
states that are in the lower left-hand quadrant of the graph.
Nearly 20 states fall into the upper right-hand quadrant of the
graph, which indicates that their test scores are higher than
the national average for both income groups of students.

Massachusetts, for example, is clearly above the national
average for both student groups, particularly for non-lowincome students.
Test score changes are also highly correlated across income
groups. Across all states, the correlation in NAEP test score
changes from 2003 to 2013 between low-income students
and non-low-income students is 0.68 and highly statistically
significant. Excluding DC, which once again is an outlier in
having much stronger gains for non-low-income students,
the correlation is 0.75. As Figure 3-4 on the next page shows,
states tend to have either strong gains for both low-income
and non-low-income students, or weak gains for both groups.
Unfortunately, Michigan exhibits below average gains for both
student income groups.
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Figure3-4. Comparison of Non-Low-Income and Low-Income Test Score Changes
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NOTE:Each point represents a state, and the red circle represents the U.S. average. The horizontal axis is the average gain in NAEP test score for reading
and math for 4th and 8th grade non-low-income students over 2003–13; the vertical axis is the same for low-income students. Michigan, Massachusetts,
and the U.S. average are identified as data points. The District of Columbia is an extreme outlier and is not shown; it experienced a gain of 35.7 points for
non-low-income students and a gain of 15.9 points for low-income students. SOURCE: National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).

Thus, some states do much better than Michigan in overall
performance for both low-income students and non-lowincome students. But in nearly all states, the levels and gains
of academic performance of both income groups are closely
linked, so states do not differ dramatically in test score gaps
or in progress in closing test score gaps.
These results suggest that, regarding the issue of
achievement gaps, the proverbial glass is half full, or maybe
even three-fourths full. As a rule, states are not achieving
much closure in the gap between low-income and non-lowincome students, but on the other hand, they are raising the
overall achievement of both groups of students. If we were to
portray the distributions of test scores for low-income and

20

non-low-income students, we would likely see bell-shaped
curves, with much of the low-income distribution to the
left of the non-low-income distribution. The fact that the
test score levels and changes are correlated across the two
groups suggests that both bell curves are moving to the right.
Unfortunately, Michigan’s progress for both these groups
is behind the national average, and even more behind the
leading states.

C. Interaction of District Level Poverty with
Family Poverty
Studies show that students’ academic achievements are
affected not only by their own income status, but also by the
characteristics of their peers. We hypothesized an interaction
effect between an individual student’s income status and

The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan

the percentage of low-income students in the district that
the student attends. Specifically, we hypothesized that
students who attend a district with a high concentration of
low-income- students are at a disadvantage compared to
low-income students in districts with less concentration of
poverty. An examination of Michigan’s K–12 school districts
shows strong evidence of this relationship.

results administered by the district.
For each one percentage point increase
in percentage of students on the free lunch
program, the composite index of the percentage of
students who are proficient on the tests declines by a half
percentage point, even controlling for total revenue per
student.21

Figure 3-5 shows the negative relationship for Michigan
school districts between the concentration of poverty in a
district, measured by the percentage of students eligible for
the free lunch program,20 and a composite of all MEAP test

The same negative relationship is found when looking at
the composite test results separately for students from
low-income families and non-low-income families. As
shown in Figure 3-6, test passing rates fall for both groups

Figure 3-5. Relationship between Student Test Results and
Concentration of Poverty in Michigan School Districts
NOTE: Each point represents
a Michigan K–12 school
district. Student test results
are a weighted average of
the percentage of students
proficient in MEAP tests taken
in 2010–2011 by students
in a K–12 school district
in Michigan. Tests include
reading, math, writing, and
science. The concentration
of poverty is measured as the
percentage of students in a
district eligible for the free
lunch program.
SOURCE: National
Aseesment of Educational
Progress (NAEP).

Free Lunch Percentage

In the analyses in this section of the report, we examine students eligible for free lunch, i.e., family income less than 130 percent of the poverty line, and do not
include students eligible for reduced price lunch.
21
The coefficient associated with the percentage on free lunch is −0.51 with a t-statistic of −34.8 and the coefficient associated with total revenue per student is
0.00029 with a t-statistic of 2.12.
20
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Figure 3-6. Relationship between Student Test Results and the
Concentration of Poverty in Michigan K-12 School Districts
for Low-Income Students and Non-Low-Income Students
NOTE: See the note for
Figure 3-5. Each point
represents a Michigan
K–12 school district. The
yellow dots present the
percentage of nonlow-income students
proficient on the MEAP
tests, and the blue dots
present the percentage
of low-income students
proficient on the MEAP
scores.

Free Lunch Percentage

as the percentage on the free lunch program increases.
When student achievement is measured as the percentage
of students proficient on the tests, the percentage falls
faster for those not on the free lunch program than for
those who are. When the scale score is used (not shown in
the figures), only the low-income students are negatively
affected by concentrated poverty in the districts they attend.
The scale scores for non-low-income families do not vary
with the percentage on the free lunch program. Therefore,
the achievement gap between students in the two income

22

groups decreases with the percentage on the free lunch
program when the percentage proficient is used, and the gap
increases when the scale scores are used.
This feedback loop, or interaction, between the academic
achievement of low-income students and the concentration
of poverty in a district amplifies the point that districts are
unique and face different challenges. It suggests that a “one
size fits all” funding scheme, even with the “one size fits all”
section 31a at-risk categorical, will be far less adequate in a
high-poverty district than in a district that has a small share
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IV: K–12 Education Financing

T

he previous chapter provides evidence that
Michigan’s student achievement has suffered
relative to the nation and especially relative to
some exemplary states. This chapter will explore
how resources affect student achievement and compare
Michigan’s financing of education to other states.

A. State Revenues per Pupil
This first section of the chapter looks at the level of funding
for K–12 education, by state. In order to meaningfully
compare states that vary greatly in the number of students,
the revenue data presented here is normalized on a per-pupil
basis.
In 1992, prior to Proposal A implementation, Michigan was
a leading state in terms of resource support for education.
It ranked 10th in total revenue per student and, at the time,

the majority of funds came from local sources. In 1993, 63.2
percent of the total state revenue for K–12 schools came
from local sources, primarily the property tax, whereas 30.6
percent came from the state and 6.2 percent came from
federal sources. Contrast these statistics with those from
2011, in which 31.0 percent was derived from local sources
and 55.1 percent came from the state, with federal sources
contributing the rest. (The 31.0 percent from local sources is
somewhat misleading, however, because the state controls
the rates of property taxes and the tax base in most districts
is limited to non-homestead property.)
Michigan’s rank among states in this statistic has dropped
considerably. It was a high-support state prior to Proposal A,
and even after Proposal A went into effect wit ranked as high
as 6th. However, the last column in Table 4-1 documents the
decline in the state’s ranking. As the table shows, prior to the

Table 4-1. Total Per-Pupil Funding, Michigan and Nationwide State Average, 1994–2011
		Nationwide State
Year
Average
1993–94
1994–95
1995–96
1996–97
1997–98
1998–99
1999–2000
2000–01
2001–02
2002–03
2003–04
2004–05
2005–06
2006–07
2007–08
2008–09
2009–10
2010–11

Percentage Change

$5,923		
6,162
4.04%
6,363
3.25
6,622
4.07
6,965
5.18
7,393
6.15
7,852
6.21
8,415
7.17
8,800
4.58
9,110
3.52
9,575
5.10
10,138
5.88
10,745
5.99
11,417
6.25
12,114
6.10
12,472
2.96
12,690
1.75
12,752
0.49

Michigan

Percentage Change

Michigan Rank

$6,962		
7,385
6.08%
7,736
4.75
7,971
3.02
8,415
5.58
8,533
1.39
8,916
4.49
9,507
6.63
10,131
6.56
10,058
–0.72
10,260
2.01
10,489
2.23
10,893
3.85
11,369
4.37
11,591
1.95
11,799
1.79
11,765
–0.29
12,266
4.26

9
8
7
7
6
9
11
10
11
14
16
19
19
20
24
25
26
23

NOTE: Dollar figures are nominal.
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2006–07 school year, the total per-pupil funding in Michigan
exceeded the state average nationwide; but since that year,
the state’s level of funding has been less than the nationwide
average. The entries in the table are totals of state, local,
and federal funding sources. The relative decline in Michigan
might be characterized as precipitous. In the eight years
between 1993–94 and 2001–02, per-pupil funding in
Michigan exceeded the national average by more than
$1,000 per student. Over the next four years, the difference
shrank considerably, becoming negative in 2006–07.

funding, whereas 21 states shifted toward more local funding.
However, for most of the states the shifts were relatively
small, with three exceptions, of which Michigan was one.
For Michigan, the share of local funding declined by 33
percentage points; New Hampshire’s share of local revenue
declined by the same amount. Vermont’s share of local
funding fell from 62.1 percent in 1993 to 7.6 percent in 2011,
a decline of 55 percentage points. Concomitantly, the state
share of funding in Vermont rose from 32.7 percent to 81.7
percent.

The switch from local to state funding was more dramatic
in Michigan than in all but one other state. As shown in
Figure 4-1, the shift by states from local to state funding or
state to local funding was fairly balanced during the period
described above. Eighteen states shifted toward more state

According to Downes (2004), who conducted a careful
analysis of Vermont’s funding mechanism and the process
by which the legislature arrived at a new method, the
subsequent legislation was “as much about property tax
relief as it was about school finance reform” (p. 286). Cullen

Figure 4-1. Percentage Change in Local and State Shares of
Per Student Financing, 1993–2011, by State

Change in State Share

NOTE: The horizontal axis is
the percentage change in the
share of per-student revenue
from local sources between
1993 and 2011. The vertical axis
is the percentage change in the
share of per-student revenue
from the state between 1992
and 2011.
SOURCE: Common Core Data,
National Center for Education
Statistics.

Change in Local Share
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Change in Total Revenue per Student

Figure 4-2. Percentage Change in State Share and Total
Revenue Per Student Financing, 1993–2011, by State

NOTE:The horizontal axis is the
percentage point change in the
share of per-student revenue
from the state between 1993
and 2011. The vertical axis is
the percentage point change
in (nominal) total revenue per
student between 1993 and
2011.
SOURCE:Common Core Data,
National Center for Education
Statistics.

Change in State Share
and Loeb (2004) suggest that Michigan’s education financing
reform in 1994 was similarly motivated by the desire for
property tax relief, as Michigan’s property tax burden at the
time was the seventh highest among the states (U.S. Census
Bureau 1992).
Vermont’s radical change in the way it financed K–12
education came about from a State Supreme Court ruling
in 1997. In response to plaintiffs who claimed that propertypoor school districts in the state could not afford the same
educational opportunities to students, the Supreme Court
stated that the existing system deprived “children of an
equal educational opportunity in violation of the Vermont

Constitution” (Brigham v. State 1997, 166 Vt. at 249).22 The
Supreme Court left it to the state legislature to find a way
to comply with its ruling. Vermont’s approach to finance
reform was to combine elements of foundation and power
equalization mechanisms. Vermont legislation established
a statewide property tax, and a portion of the foundation aid
was funded through that tax. The power equalization part of
the funding mechanism ensured that localities with the same
nominal tax rates would have the same levels of education
spending.
Does the share of funding from state and local sources make
a difference in the overall level of revenue per student? Most

Cited in Downes (2004).
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states have made some changes in the share of revenue
from local and state sources to fund K–12 education. Some
states have changed their funding mechanisms with the
purpose of reducing differences in per-pupil revenue across
school districts in their state and to increase the overall level
of funding, with a minimum increase in the tax burden on
local taxpayers. We examined whether there was a significant
difference in funding per student in states that made these
changes. As shown in Figure 4-2 on the previous page, there
is no obvious relationship between the change in the share of
state funding (expressed in percentage point terms) and the
change in per-student total revenue at the state level. What
is noticeable is that Michigan’s percentage increase in perstudent total revenue is among the lowest during this time.
Only Oregon, Arizona, and Florida had percentage increases

smaller than Michigan’s (nominal) 60 percent gain between
1993 and 2011. The average increase among the states and
the District of Columbia during that time was 79 percent, with
a minimum of 55 percent (Florida) and a maximum of 111
percent (Wyoming).
An interesting relationship holds between the growth in total
revenue per student and the growth in student enrollment
during this period. As shown in Figure 4-3, those states
(and the District of Columbia) with higher enrollment
growth experienced lower per-student total revenue growth.
Michigan’s K–12 student enrollment fell one percentage
point between 1993 and 2011. However, the 12 other states
with declines in enrollment outpaced Michigan with a greater
increase in total revenue per student.

Figure 4-3. Percentage Change in per Student Total Revenue
and in K–12 Student Enrollment, 1993–2011, by State

Change in Total Revenue per Student

NOTE: The horizontal axis is the
percentage change in a state’s
student enrollment between
1992 and 2011. The vertical
axis is the percentage change
in (nominal) total revenue per
student between 1992 and
2011.
SOURCE:Common Core Data,
National Center for Education
Statistics.

Change in K–12 Student Enrollment
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During the past two decades, Michigan was one of a small
be considered a component, for
handful of states that shifted the major source of revenue
property to be valuable and contribute
for schools from local areas to the state. Of that small
to the tax base it must be used for productive
sample, Michigan had, by far, the smallest growth in per-pupil purposes, which are captured in GSP. The second
revenue. Furthermore, over that time frame, most states
measure is the revenue generated from local and state
experienced enrollment growth; however,
sources (not federal) to fund K–12 education.
Michigan did not. Of the states that had
enrollment losses, Michigan was
A useful tautology is to divide revenue
again at the bottom of the pack
per student into three components:
in terms of growth in per-pupil
1) revenue per GSP, 2) GSP
During the past two
revenue. Clearly, over this
per capita, and 3) total state
time frame, Michigan was
population per pupil. Revenue
decades, Michigan was one
not able to hold its own in
per GSP is a measure of
of a small handful of states
terms of resource support
effort relative to capacity
(revenue) per student.
— how much of the state’s
that
shifted
the
major
source
Recognizing that the level of
GSP is going toward K–12
school aid is determined by
education. GSP per capita
of revenue for schools from
the governor and legislature,
is considered the revenue
we nevertheless believe that
capacity
of a state. The ratio of
local areas to the state.
Michigan’s lagging support was
the total state population to the
mainly a matter of affordability
number of students is essentially a
and not a political choice. The
demographic characteristic of a state
political decision makers were
that indicates how broadly educational
hamstrung by Michigan’s problems with its
resources must be spent. Lower values of this
fiscal capacity, as will be described in the next section.
ratio — equivalent to higher numbers of students per
person in a state — mean that a state’s population must
B. Michigan’s Fiscal Capacity and Types of
educate relatively more students, holding constant the state’s
Expenditure
fiscal capacity (GSP per capita). Multiplying together the three
The resources that any state has available to fund K–12
components yields revenue per pupil. This tautology offers
education depend upon two key factors: the size of the tax
a convenient way to examine which of the three may explain
base and the rate at which the state taxes that base. As
differences across states in the funding of K–12 education on
described in the previous section, the tax base for Michigan
a per-pupil basis.
changed dramatically with Proposal A, moving from heavy
reliance on local taxes to a higher percentage of state
Education Week (2015) graded all 50 states plus the District
funding. Nonetheless, the tax base is still a combination
of Columbia on school finance issues. This analysis used two
of local property and items subject to a state sales tax.
fiscal components. First, for fiscal capacity, it relies on real
Therefore, in order to compare the resources available and
GSP per capita — the same measure for fiscal capacity as
the tax effort expended across states for K–12 education, two described above. The second measure is real state and local
measures are used. The first is gross state product (GSP),
revenue per student. Dividing real state and local revenue per
which is the broadest measure of the capacity of a state’s
student by real GSP per capita yields the measure of fiscal
economy to support K–12 education. Although GSP does
effort times population per student — the third component
not capture the stock of capital, of which property could
listed in the previous paragraph.
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Table 4-2. Gross State Product, State and Local Educational Revenue,
and Indices of Effort and Capacity in 2012, by State
State

Real GSP per Capita
(1)

Real (S&L) Revenue per Student
(2)

Revenue Effort Index
(3)

Revenue Capacity Index
(4)

Index of Revenue Effort
Relative to Capacity
(5)

Alabama
$44,617
$9,672
87.2
86.8
100.5%
Alaska
76,135
14504
130.7
148.1
88.3
Arizona
42,233
7,373
66.4
82.1
80.9
Arkansas
46,060
10,764
97.0
89.6
108.3
California
49,494
8,250
74.3
96.3
77.2
Colorado
52,850
9,181
82.7
102.8
80.5
Connecticut
61,848
16,372
147.5
120.3
122.7
Delaware
64,646
13,443
121.1
125.7
96.4
DC
149,678
22,626
203.9
291.1
70.0
Florida
40,292
8,019
72.3
78.4
92.2
Georgia
48,028
10,220
92.1
93.4
98.6
Hawaii
44,437
10,350
93.3
86.4
107.9
Idaho
38,987
6,849
61.7
75.8
81.4
Illinois
54,363
12,823
115.6
105.7
109.3
Indiana
51,522
12,045
108.5
100.2
108.3
Iowa
56,919
12,449
112.2
110.7
101.4
Kansas
53,560
11,916
107.4
104.2
103.1
Kentucky
45,752
10,253
92.4
89.0
103.8
Louisiana
59,763
11,381
102.6
116.2
88.2
Maine
40,743
12,581
113.4
79.2
143.1
Maryland
51,375
13,563
122.2
99.9
122.3
Massachusetts
60,626
14,803
133.4
117.9
113.1
Michigan
44,670
11,779
106.2
86.9
122.2
Minnesota
56,872
12,551
113.1
110.6
102.3
Mississippi
39,376
8,661
78.1
76.6
101.9
Missouri
50,770
11,380
102.6
98.7
103.9
Montana
44,506
10,435
94.0
86.6
108.6
Nebraska
61,646
12,265
110.5
119.9
92.2
Nevada
47,576
8,671
78.1
92.5
84.5
New Hampshire
47,135
13,202
119.0
91.7
129.8
New Jersey
52,280
16,632
149.9
101.7
147.4
New Mexico
45,111
9,586
86.4
87.7
98.5
New York
56,710
18,034
162.5
110.3
147.4
North Carolina
50,640
8,181
73.7
98.5
74.9
North Dakota
78,280
12,973
116.9
152.2
76.8
Ohio
53,268
13,767
124.1
103.6
119.8
Oklahoma
49,987
8,457
76.2
97.2
78.4
Oregon
54,572
9,870
88.9
106.1
83.8
Pennsylvania
49,998
14,975
135.0
97.2
138.8
Rhode Island
49,743
14,675
132.2
96.7
136.7
South Carolina
41,542
10,824
97.5
80.8
120.7
South Dakota
59,533
9,620
86.7
115.8
74.9
Tennessee
47,899
8,491
76.5
93.2
82.1
Texas
58,178
9,342
84.2
113.1
74.4
Utah
48,657
7,062
63.6
94.6
67.3
Vermont
44,997
16,311
147.0
87.5
168.0
Virginia
52,687
10,271
92.6
102.5
90.3
Washington
54,922
10,026
90.4
106.8
84.6
West Virginia
42,406
14,109
127.1
82.5
154.2
Wisconsin
51,146
12,412
111.9
99.5
112.5
Wyoming
75,296
17,467
157.4
146.4
107.5
					
U.S. Average
$ 51,419
$11,097
100
100
100%
NOTE: Column (1) has per-capita GSP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) adjusted by state cost of living from the BEA. Column (2) has per-student state and local
revenue from U.S. Census Bureau (2014) adjusted by state cost of living. Column (3) is an index of column (2) with the U.S. average at 100; column (4) is an index of column (1)
with the U.S. average at 100. Column (5) is column (3) divided by column (4) in percentage terms.
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These measures are shown in Table 4-2, with the two
measures of GSP per capita and revenue per student
expressed as an index and revenue effort expressed as the
ratio of revenue per student to GSP per capita. The Education
Week article ranked Michigan 23rd among the states. One of
the criteria used in determining this grade was “percent of
taxable resources spent on education (2012).” At 3.8 percent,
Michigan was above the national average of 3.4 percent (in
fact, Michigan had the 12th highest percentage). The data
used to proxy for “taxable resources” in the Education Week
rankings was GSP. In Table 4-2, we show Michigan’s fiscal
capacity using the same data as Education Week, except
that we have converted the individual state revenue and GSP
into real dollars, using a state-level cost adjustment from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Michigan is near the bottom quintile of states in GSP per
capita at $44,670 (ranks 41st) and concomitantly in the
revenue capacity index at 86.9 percent (this statistic may
be interpreted as indicating that Michigan’s GSP per capita
is about 13 percent below the national average.). By this
measure, Michigan is well below all of its competitor states
in the North Central region of the country — Illinois, Indiana,
Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin. Despite such a low resource
base, Michigan is in the middle of the pack (25th) in per-pupil
(state plus local) revenue at $11,779. Not surprisingly then,
Michigan’s index of effort relative to capacity is relatively
high (ranked 11th). The bottom line is that, as measured by
GSP per capita, Michigan is a relatively poor state, and yet it
continues to fund education relatively well.
The importance of a strong economy for financing K–12
education can be illustrated by considering how an increase
in GSP per capita might affect state and local revenue
per pupil. Consider the effect on state and local revenue
per pupil if Michigan’s economy was equal to the national
average — $51,419 per capita, without changing any other
factors that affect the generation of revenue, such as overall

fiscal effort. Such an improvement
in the state economy — which is not
an unreasonable scenario since Michigan’s
real per capita GSP around the year 2000 was
approximately equal to the national average — would
generate an additional 15 percent in revenue from state and
local sources, bringing Michigan’s ranking in revenue to 14th
position from 25th. State and local revenue per student
in this case would be 122 percent of the national average,
offering nearly $2,000 more revenue dollars per student to
support education. Obviously, if GSP per capita for Michigan
were even higher, so would be the revenue available for
education. Unfortunately, in the short run, there is not much
that state government can do about the current economy,
but in the long run investment in education can be a stimulus
in putting the economy on a higher growth path. (See Bauer
et al., 2006.).
Another factor that figures heavily in the generation of state
and local revenue for K–12 education is fiscal effort. This is
defined as state and local revenue as a percentage of GSP
and is related to the willingness of state residents to tax their
income to support government activities, and then more
specifically to direct those funds to education. Table 4-2
shows the fiscal effort as an index pegged to the national
average. Michigan’s fiscal effort is 122 percent of the national
average, which places it 11th among the states. If the effort
were intensified to be more like the fiscal effort of New York
and New Jersey, two of the exemplary states identified earlier,
state and local revenue per student would grow from $11,779
to $14,205, providing nearly $2,500 more per student. This
hike in fiscal effort would place Michigan at 128 percent of the
national average.
From a fiscal viewpoint, the state’s role in K–12 education is
to provide revenue; districts determine how the revenue gets
spent. An important category of expenditure is instructional
expenses.23 The average state share of revenue spent

Chakrabarti and Roy (2012) provide justification for why this fiscal statistic is important. Basically, they argue that it is a proxy for school district productivity.
They furthermore cite U.S. Department of Education (2009), a communique that explicitly asked school districts to invest Title I dollars in improving instruction,
so as to bolster student achievement.
23

29

UPJOHN INSTITUTE

W.E.

For Employment Research

on instruction is a little over 50 percent. Table 4-3 shows
the percent of revenue spent on instruction for the years
1993–94 and 2011–12 for the 50 states and DC. There is not
a great deal of variation by state; in the latter year of data,
the national average is 52.6 percent and the minimum and
maximum are 39.3 percent (DC) and 62.6 percent (NY),
respectively. However, this seems to be an expenditure
category for which Michigan is relatively weak. It ranked
44th in 1993–94 and 40th in 2011–12. Note that benefits
for current employees are included in this figure, although
pension and health benefits for retired personnel are not. It
should also be noted that capital costs for charter schools
are included in (non-instructional) operating expenses, which
may tend to depress the instructional percent of spending.

among the states but 6th in terms of benefits as a share of
total expenditures. Note that these benefits are for current
employees only and do not include pension or retirement
health benefits. When measured as the ratio of employee
benefits to total salaries for instructional personnel (teachers
and aides), the state ranked third, with a share of 53
percent. Only West Virginia and Alaska ranked higher by this
measure. The relatively high costs in Michigan are caused
by relatively high salaries that naturally increase the cost
of benefits that are tied to salaries including payroll taxes
and pension contributions. The latter are inflated by the
necessity of covering the unfunded liabilities in the Michigan
State Professional Employee Retirement System (MPSERS)
defined benefit pension and retiree health benefit plans.

We examined several general categories of non-instructional
expenditures, which constitute approximately half of
the budget. Michigan’s expenditures on general district
administration and school building administration are
relatively low compared to other states (in the bottom onethird of states in both cases). Furthermore, expenditures on
operations and maintenance are particularly low in 2011–12,
ranking 47th and dropping from 32nd in 1993. On the other
hand, Michigan’s expenditures on student support services
and other support services are relatively high (top fifth of
states). Student support services comprise guidance, school
health, hearing, and speech specialists. Other support
services include business offices and data processing (not
instructional IT support). Instructional support services
(training, media centers, audio/visual) and professional
and technical support services (legal, accounting/auditing,
rentals) are in the middle of the pack.

In summary, Michigan spends a relatively high share of
its fiscal capacity on education. However, when we look at
national data at how expenditures are made, we see that
Michigan is among the highest states in terms of per-pupil
employee benefits, student support services, and other
support services. It is among the lowest states in terms of
per-pupil instructional spending.

Benefits to employees in Michigan are relatively high. In
1993, the state paid, on average, $1,244 in benefits per pupil.
This was the 9th highest level of benefits among the states,
and it ranked 10th in terms of benefits as a share of total
expenditures. By 2011, the cost of employee benefits per
student had increased to $2,786,24 which is 15th highest

A policy option might be to try to shift spending from noninstruction-related items to instruction-related categories.
Among the non-instruction-related categories, Michigan is
already ranked toward the bottom of states in administrative
and operations and maintenance expenses. That leaves the
option of trying to tackle benefit costs, which is difficult to do
and could be counterproductive if that makes it difficult to
retain and attract qualified teachers. Nonetheless, the state
is addressing these issues with its move toward a defined
contribution pension system and, at the district level, with
early retirement incentive packages.

C. District Expenditures per Pupil
The prior section gives a “macro” picture of the funds
available to districts, i.e., their revenue, on a state-by-state
basis. That section documents Michigan’s slide at the state

This is $1,790 in 1993 dollars, which implies that there has been a real increase in benefit costs of 44 percent per pupil over the period between 1993 and 2011.
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Table 4-3. Share of K–12 Revenue Spent on
Instruction in 1993–94 and 2011–12, by State
State

1993–94 Share of Revenue
Spent on Instruction

2011–12 Share of Revenue
Spent on Instruction

1993–94 Rank

2011–12 Rank

Alabama
54.4%
52.1%
31
24
Alaska
41.9
49.3
51
43
Arizona
47.3
46.2
49
50
Arkansas
55.3
49.6
24
41
California
51.8
51.1
43
31
Colorado
53.7
48.2
35
47
Connecticut
59.6
57.8
4
8
Delaware
59.4
58.2
5
4
DC
47.0
39.3
50
51
Florida
49.3
55.3
48
14
Georgia
55.4
53.6
23
19
Hawaii
54.4
50.3
32
37
Idaho
56.3
52.6
16
23
Illinois
55.7
50.8
21
33
Indiana
53.1
48.5
38
45
Iowa
56.8
50.7
11
34
Kansas
55.0
50.7
26
35
Kentucky
55.8
52.1
20
25
Louisiana
54.6
53.1
29
21
Maine
60.3
55.5
3
12
Maryland
56.3
55.3
15
15
Massachusetts
55.1
57.7
25
9
Michigan
51.4
49.7
44
40
Minnesota
56.3
53.8
14
18
Mississippi
56.1
50.1
19
39
Missouri
52.9
51.2
39
30
Montana
58.4
54.9
9
16
Nebraska
55.4
55.9
22
11
Nevada
52.1
52.0
41
26
New Hampshire
58.7
60.2
8
2
New Jersey
53.2
56.4
36
10
New Mexico
50.9
47.9
47
48
New York
62.2
62.6
2
1
North Carolina
56.7
58.2
12
5
North Dakota
56.6
48.3
13
46
Ohio
53.9
49.5
34
42
Oklahoma
52.0
48.7
42
44
Oregon
54.3
51.7
33
28
Pennsylvania
57.7
52.9
10
22
Rhode Island
64.6
58.1
1
6
South Carolina
52.1
46.9
40
49
South Dakota
56.3
51.0
17
32
Tennessee
56.2
59.7
18
3
Texas
51.0
50.6
45
36
Utah
54.9
51.8
27
27
Vermont
59.4
53.4
6
20
Virginia
53.2
54.4
37
17
Washington
50.9
51.4
46
29
West Virginia
54.7
58.0
28
7
Wisconsin
58.8
55.3
7
13
Wyoming
54.6
50.2
30
38
				
U.S. Average
54.8
52.6		
SOURCE: Common Core Data System, NCES.
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Table 4-4. Median District Current Expenditures per Pupil and 90th–10th Percentile
District Gap in Current Expenditures per Pupil, 2010–11, by State
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Median District Expend.
per Pupil

Rank

Gap

Rank

Number of
Districts

$8,613
20,315
7,558
8,847
8,295
8,694
14,832
11,862
18,475
9,021
9,098
12,004
7,103
9,464
8,649
9,131
10,034
9,109
10,519
13,080
13,135
12,778
8,914
9,523
8,238
8,309
11,554
11,222
9,796
13,996
14,851
10,201
17,608
8,684
10,505
9,590
7,805
9,222
11,462
13,773
8,940
8,657
7,566
9,135
6,800
14,069
9,567
9,406
11,852
11,476
16,548

43
1
49
38
45
39
6
14
2
35
34
13
50
28
42
32
23
33
20
11
10
12
37
27
46
44
16
19
24
8
5
22
3
40
21
25
47
30
18
9
36
41
48
31
51
7
26
29
15
17
4

27%
149%
42%
36%
57%
51%
32%
47%
0%
25%
36%
0%
67%
46%
41%
26%
41%
32%
55%
43%
28%
46%
37%
40%
47%
42%
63%
48%
89%
54%
52%
83%
66%
38%
61%
41%
43%
41%
45%
38%
55%
57%
25%
49%
88%
58%
36%
41%
22%
28%
59%

6
50
23
13
39
34
9
30
1
3
12
1
46
29
19
5
18
10
38
25
7
28
14
17
31
24
44
32
49
36
35
47
45
16
43
21
26
22
27
15
37
40
4
33
48
41
11
20
2
8
42

131
39
91
239
397
130
115
16
1
67
178
1
87
394
289
314
247
169
72
96
24
211
500
304
148
386
18
174
16
65
220
70
627
115
73
607
359
140
494
31
83
105
122
849
40
30
130
209
55
354
43

NOTE: Gap is per-pupil expenditure for district at the 90th percentile in the state divided by per-pupil expenditure for the district at the 10th percentile in the state, expressed as
a percentage.
SOURCE: Common Core Data System, NCES.
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level over the past decade, and it documents how the shift
in funding mechanism undertaken with Proposal A placed
Michigan in a small subset of states that had major changes
over the past two decades. In this section, we examine
expenditures by districts on a per-pupil basis.
The Common Core Data system from NCES contains
financial data for each local education agency (LEA) in the
country. The database includes over 19,000 LEAs, although
not all of these are K–12 districts. Some are intermediate
school districts, charter schools, or educational institutions
for students with special needs. Others are districts that
may cover only elementary schools or only high schools.
This section examines data from LEAs that are considered
to be traditional school districts (including districts with
associated charter schools) that have both elementary and
secondary education. In the analysis, we have excluded as
outliers one very large district (New York City) and several
very small districts. We eliminated the latter by setting an
arbitrary target of enrollment sufficient to have 20 students
in each grade 1 through 12, a total of at least 240 students.
We excluded New York City because of its sheer size of nearly
a million students. We also eliminated districts with zero or
unreported current expenditures. With these restrictions, our
sample includes 9,675 K–12 districts.
For this sample, the average current expenditure per student
in the most recent year available (2010–11) is $10,663, and
the average student enrollment is 4,510 students.25The
variation is quite large, particularly in enrollment, which
ranges from a low of 241, just over the cutoff point, to a high
of 667,273 (Los Angeles Unified School District). Current
expenditures per student range from a low of $647 to a high
of $50,462. The school district with the highest per-student
expenditure in the sample is a small district in New York

State. There are six other districts
with current expenditures per student
above $40,000 and they are small districts
located either in New York or Alaska.
Table 4-4 lists the current expenditures per student for the
median K–12 district (in terms of per-pupil expenditures);
the difference, in percentage terms, between the total
current expenditures per student for the district at the 90th
percentile and the district at the 10th percentile in each
state’s distribution of expenditures per pupil; and the number
of districts in each state. Note that the ranking for the
difference in the gap between the 90th percentile and 10th
percentile districts goes from smallest to largest.
Alaska is clearly an outlier among the states. It has by far
the highest median current expenditure per student, but
also it has the largest gap in spending between the 90th and
10th percentile districts, with a difference of 149 percent.
The District of Columbia, as a single, large urban district,
is also apparently an outlier in terms of expenditures per
student, with almost $18,500. Note that Utah and Idaho,
with median expenditures per pupil of around $7,000, are
significantly lower than all other states. Ignoring the singledistrict cases of Hawaii and DC, West Virginia has the least
disparity in spending, according to the gap measure, with
only a 22 percent difference between the 90th and the 10th
percentile district. Consistent with the data on state-by-state
comparisons of spending, Michigan is relatively low in the
median expenditure measure, where it is ranked 37th.26 Its
median district spends $8,914 per student. However, the gap
in per-pupil spending between the 90th percentile district
and the 10th percentile district — at 37 percent — is relatively
small, with Michigan ranked 14th.

About 80 percent of the districts in our sample include preschool expenditure and enrollment data. The mean per-pupil expenditures for districts with (without)
preschool is $10,466 ($11,297); the mean enrollment for districts with (without) preschool is 4,746 (3,685).
26
Michigan is ranked 24th according to total expenditures on current operations of all local education agencies in the state divided by total student count
(Cornman, et al., 2013). The difference between the measure presented here and the total expenditures on current operations per student is that the former
excludes expenditures on education by agencies that are not included in our list of K–12 districts. This includes intermediate school districts, schools devoted to
students with specific needs or opportunities, and charter schools. It also excludes Detroit Public Schools, which is the largest district in the state and spends
$13,415 per student. Leaving that school district out of the calculation of total expenditures per student for the state will lower the state’s ranking in that category,
although other states are in similar situations..
25
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Table 4-5. Funding Mechanisms, by State (2011)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Total no. of states

Foundation

Local Effort
Equalization

Equalization

Full State
Funding

Flat Grant

Other

1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
37

1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
23

0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
22

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
7

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
5

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6

SOURCE: http://www.edcounts.org/createtable/viewtable.php.
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D. Financing Mechanisms

schemes for some states; that is, they
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

States finance K–12 education in several ways:
n

n

n

n

n

n

As shown in the table, 37 states use a foundation grant
approach, whereas 23 use local equalization and 22 use
equalization. The remaining 12 use either full state funding
or flat grant. Of those using a foundation approach, 17 also
use local effort equalization, 15 use equalization, and 7 use
either full state funding or flat grant. While the foundation
grant approach dominates, the other mechanisms are used
in combination with that approach.

Foundation: State guarantees minimum amount of
funding for each school district; requires districts to
raise local portion of this amount
Local equalization effort: State guarantees that for
any given level of local taxation effort a district will
receive equal yield
Equalization: State accounts for property wealth,
taxation effort, and relative district need to
determine funding levels
Full state funding: State requires that state provides
all money needed for basic education
Flat grant amount: State uniformly allocates dollars
per student or instructional unit.
Other: Other type of funding plan

How, if at all, does the funding mechanism of a state
influence the financing in the state? As displayed in Table
4-6, current expenditures per student vary across states
that use different funding schemes. The 22 states that have
adopted an equalization approach have the highest average
per-student expenditure, whereas the seven states that use
full state funding have the lowest per-student expenditures.
Not surprisingly, those same seven states that use full state
funding rely the most on state revenue and rely the least on
local revenue to finance K–12 education.

According to EdCounts, the research arm of Education
Week, the funding mechanisms adopted by the states and
the District of Columbia can best be described according to
Table 4-5. There is some overlap in classification of financing

Table 4-6. Descriptive Statistics about Districts, by State Financing Type

Mean/median current exp/student
Mean (or median) enrollment

Foundation

Local Effort
Equalization

Equalization

Full State
Funding

Flat Grant

$ 10,808

10,020

11,874

9,789

9,833

4,822

4,973

4,600

4,837

4,647

Share of district revenue from:					
Local

41.6

39.9

44.6

31.5

41.2

State

46.9

46.4

44.2

58.6

47.4

Federal
Property tax
Percent black
Percent free or reduced price lunch
(# districts, # states)

11.5

13.6

11.2

9.8

11.4

72.4

72.6

75.6

70.8

76.9

9.5

10.9

8.3

5.9

8.8

39.0

42.6

36.1

36.9

39.6

(7504, 37)

(4429,23)

(4045, 22)

(811,7)

(727, 5)

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from its trimmed version of Common Core Data System, National Center for Education Statistics.
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To explore the effects of state policies and the use of
revenue sources, we examine those groups of states that
are considered to follow a particular policy and compare the
variance in district revenues within a state to the variance
across states. For example, for those 23 states classified as
using local effort equalization as a financing policy, the withinstate variance is 60 percent higher than the between-state
variance, whereas for the remaining 28 states (and DC) that
do not use local effort equalization, the within-state variance
is only 17 percent higher. The variance decomposition
suggests that this method of financing, in which the state
subsidizes districts so the same tax rate can generate the
same revenue, yields a much larger share of the variance due
to within-state differences relative to cross-state differences,
as compared with states that do not use that financing
method. Higher within-state variance is also found for the
share of state revenue to local districts, which also suggests
that the use of state funds to help individual districts within
the state generate the same revenue with equal tax effort.
In contrast, states that have not adopted a policy of local
equalization effort financing have higher variance in the share
of state revenue across states than within states.

E. Financing Mechanisms in Exemplary States
Chapter 3 identified seven exemplary states based on levels
and trends of student achievement, both for all students as a
whole and for low-income students. We focus on the funding
mechanisms in these states (in alphabetical order).

Florida. As noted in Table 4-3, Florida has a complex
system of funding that relies on a foundation grant, local
effort equalization, and equalization. The foundation grant
is referred to as the base student allocation, and is a little
over $4,400 for 2014–15. State funding is determined by
multiplying the allocation by a weighted measure of fulltime equivalent (FTE) students. Several factors are used to
weight the FTEs, almost all of which are intended to capture
differences in costs.

The exact multiplier is 0.4974.

27
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Among the factors that increase the weighted FTEs are
“sparsity” of the district; grade levels; declining enrollment;
and enrollment of students in special education, gifted
and talented programs, and English for Speakers of Other
Languages (ESOL). The sparsity factor is intended to adjust
for the relatively higher operating costs of smaller districts.
FTEs in grades K–3 increase FTE weights by 8.9 percent, and
FTEs in grades 9–12 increase FTE weights by 3.1 percent.
Districts with declining enrollment get an increased weight,
and finally, the state has a complex system for weighting
special education, gifted and talented, and ESOL FTEs.
In addition to the state funding, local districts are allowed
to levy up to 0.748 mills for operating expenses, and with a
supermajority, may levy an additional 0.250 mills for critical
operating or capital outlay expenditures. The local levy is
equalized at the state average per unweighted FTE.
In short, Florida places considerable weight on cost
differentials, and allows local districts to raise their own funds
through a state-equalized property tax levy.

Indiana. Legislators and policymakers in Indiana are
currently debating whether the state’s school funding system
over- or undercompensates for the cost of educating lowincome students (Wang 2014). Local school corporations or
charter schools are mainly funded by the state grant, which is
determined by a foundation funding amount multiplied by an
adjusted average daily membership (ADM). The foundation
funding amount in 2015 is about $4,600. The adjustment to
the ADM is a multiplier determined by the count of students
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. This multiplier is
called an adjusted complexity index, and it is calculated by
multiplying the percentage of students on free or reduced
price lunch by about one-half,27 and then adding that to 1.0.
So, for example, if a school district has about 50 percent of its
students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, its adjusted
complexity index would be approximately 1.25.
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Beginning in 2012, an adjustment was instituted based on
enrollment size. This adjustment was zero for schools with
an ADM of less than 500 in the previous school year; $150
for schools with an ADM of between 500 and 1,000; and
$150,000 divided by the previous-year ADM for schools with
an ADM greater than 1,000 students.

and the foundation grant. In wealthy
districts, the local share per student may
exceed the foundation, and so the state share
would theoretically be set at 0. However the Bridge to
Excellence program set a minimum of 15 percent for the state
share.

This adjusted foundation funding amount is modified further
by a “transition to foundation” calculation. If the funding
amount is approximately equal to the foundation grant value,
there is no modification. Otherwise, the modification to the
funding amount is approximately plus or minus 15 percent of
the difference between it and the foundation grant value, so
that districts move toward equalization. Over and above this
modified, adjusted basic state grant are state funds allocated
for honors diplomas, special education, career and technical
education, and full-day kindergarten. Also, transportation
services and building improvements are funded through
separate local tax levies. In 2009, the state disallowed the use
of local levies for operating expenses. Unlike traditional public
schools, charter schools receive no local property tax funding
for capital projects or transportation.

Maryland has an equalization program, the Guaranteed Tax
Base Program, which provides state funding to local districts
with average property wealth per pupil less than 80 percent
of the statewide average. It also adjusts funding based on the
geographic cost of education and provides additional funds
to districts that do not receive at least a 1 percent increase in
state aid.

In summary, the funding philosophy in Indiana heavily
weights the level of low-income student enrollment, and
otherwise leans toward full state funding and eventual
equalization.

Maryland. The finance system in Maryland, which was
reformed in 2002 as the Bridge to Excellence program, is a
foundation grant system that has a local equalization feature.
The legislature based its foundation grant on the results of
an adequacy study, and by fiscal 2015, the grant has risen to
a level of $6,860. The funding is intended to be split equally
between the state and local districts. The total general
education support for the state equals the foundation grant
multiplied by FTE enrollments. One-half of this is the state
share. The other half is the local share, which is allocated
by the share of statewide property wealth held in a district.
The state share then is the residual between the local share

The state pays the entire cost of pension/retirement benefits
for eligible school personnel.
Maryland also has significant funding for special education
students, compensatory education (low-income) students,
and English language learning students. The supplemental
funding for these students are 74 percent, 97 percent, and 99
percent of the foundation grant, respectively. For example, a
student eligible for free or reduced price lunch would have a
funding level of 1.97 times the foundation grant.
In summary, Maryland has a foundation grant that was
originally set by an adequacy study. The foundation grant is
intended to be equally met with local tax revenue, although
the local share is equalized with state funds. The foundation
grant has an adjustment for differential costs by geographic
area. Finally, the state has quite significant supplemental
funding for special education, compensatory (at-risk)
education, and English language learners.

Massachusetts. Like Maryland, Massachusetts has a
foundation grant system, and the funding is shared between
the state and local school districts. Unlike other states with a
foundation grant system, Massachusetts actually has several
grant levels that adjust for cost differentials. A district’s
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foundation budget is derived by multiplying the enrollment
in 14 categories by cost rates in 11 functional areas.28 The
enrollments are pupil counts as of October 1 of the previous
school year and are classified into the following 10 categories:
n Regular education or special education
n Regular or special education half-day kindergarten
n Regular or special education full-day kindergarten
n Regular or special education elementary (grades
1–5)
n Regular or special education junior high/middle
(grades 6–8)
n Regular or special education senior high (grades
9–13)
n Limited English pre-kindergarten
n Limited English half-day kindergarten
n Limited English (grades 1–12)
n Vocational education
Increments are added to the foundation grants for students
who fall in one of the following three categories: in-district
special education, out-of-district special education, and lowincome status (eligible for free or reduced price lunch). Preschool and half-day kindergarten program enrollments count
as 0.5 FTEs. The functional areas are as follows:
n Administration
n Instructional leadership
n Classroom and specialist teachers
n Other teaching services
n Professional development
n Instructional equipment & technology
n Guidance and psychological
n Pupil services
n Operations and maintenance
n Employee benefits/fixed charges
n Special education tuition
Each pupil generates a specific cost in each of these
functional areas. The costs are higher at the elementary
and upper grades (FY2015 costs per elementary student

are $7,353; per middle school student, $6,971; and per high
school student, $8,693), and higher for limited English and
vocational programs. Special education and low-income
students have higher costs as well. The FY2015 increment for
low-income students in grades 1–8 is $3,422 and in grades
9–12 is $2,767.
A wage adjustment factor is used for districts in a geographic
area where average wages are higher than in other areas of
the state.
The local share of the cost is determined by the district’s
share of total property wealth in the state and total income
in the state. The state pays the difference between the
foundation budget and the local share. Charter school tuition
rates are based on the foundation budgets calculated for
each sending district’s pupils. Charter school tuition is the
name of the state payments to the charter school; they are
not payments required from students to attend.
In short, the funding mechanism in Massachusetts is
intended to split the costs between the state and the local
district. Furthermore, it is based on cost differentials, takes
account of variation in wealth among districts, and has a very
high (relative to other states) support level for low-income
students.

New Hampshire. New Hampshire has a relatively
straightforward foundation grant system. It is intended to
be based on a cost of adequacy and will be adjusted every
two years by the Consumer Price Index-Urban consumers,
Northeast Region, for “services less medical care services.”
In FY 2014, the foundation grant base was $3,498. That base
is raised by $1,719 for students who are eligible for free or
reduced price lunch, $1,882 for special education students,
$648 for English language learners receiving English
instruction, and $648 for each 3rd grade pupil not proficient
in the reading component of the state assessment and not
eligible for the other adjustments.

This system was designed by a committee of school district superintendents and a consultant economist in the early 1990s (Moscovitch 1992). The costs were
intended to constitute “an adequate — but not excessive — level of funding.”
28
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The state determines the total state support for school
districts and notifies each municipality annually about how
much it needs to raise in property tax. Municipalities send
that portion of their property tax receipts directly to school
districts.

New Jersey. This state’s funding mechanism is based on
the School Funding Reform Act of 2008. It is a foundationbased formula with district equalization. In recent years,
the aid has not been fully funded because of budgetary
constraints.
In FY 2011, the per-pupil foundation grant was $9,971. This
grant is multiplied by a weighted projected student count
to determine a district’s adequacy budget. The weights are
0.50 for half-day kindergarten; 1.0 for full-day kindergarten
through grade 5; 1.04 for grades 6–8; and 1.17 for grades
9–12. County vocational students are given a weight of 1.31.
Students eligible for free or reduced price lunch increase
the relevant grade level weight by an additive factor of 0.47
to 0.57, depending on the low-income concentration in
the district. The 0.47 factor applies for districts where the
concentration of low-income students is no more than 20
percent, and the 0.57 factor applies for districts where the
concentration of low-income students is at least 60 percent;
interpolated factors apply for districts within this range of
low-income concentration. English language learners garner
an additional weighting factor of 0.50 if they are not lowincome, and 0.125 if they also qualify for the low-income
supplemental weight. Special education students are
provided higher foundation grants depending on actual costs.
On average, local districts’ tax levies cover about 25 percent
of the total per-pupil aid, although this percentage varies
considerably. For districts that have relatively low income and
wealth, the state provides equalization aid to cover the perpupil adequacy budget. The state contributes to the teachers’
pension fund, pays the employer share of Social Security

29
30

taxes, and supports the cost of postretirement medical benefits for retirees.
In general, New Jersey has a foundation grant system
that weights students in middle school more than those
in elementary school, and students in high schools more
than those in middle school. The state has a fairly large
supplement for low-income and LEP students — on the
order of $5,000 per student. Local communities are able to
support school budgets above and beyond the foundation
grant.

Pennsylvania. In 2006, the Pennsylvania legislature
directed the State Board of Education to conduct an
adequacy study to determine the “basic cost per pupil that
will permit a student to meet the state’s academic standards
and assessments.” The base cost in the 2010–11 fiscal
year was $8,950. A district’s allocation equals that base
cost multiplied by a grade-level modified ADM. Half-day
kindergarten is weighted at 0.50; elementary students are
weighted at 1.0; and secondary students (grades 7–12) are
weighted at 1.36.
The state has poverty and English language learner
supplements. The poverty supplement is the product of the
base cost and the number of students eligible for free or
reduced price meals, multiplied by 0.43. The English language
learner supplement is the number of students identified as
limited English proficiency (LEP), multiplied by the product of
the base cost and a factor dependent on ADM.29
The state also has a district size supplement and an
adjustment for geographic price differences. The size
supplement is the greater of zero or the product of the base
cost, the ADM, and ADM-dependent adjustment factor.30 The
geographic price difference is based on a cost metric.

The ADM factor is: 3.753 − 0.23 × ln (ADM), where ln() refers to the natural log. The effective factor is subject to a minimum of 1.48 and a maximum of 2.43.
This adjustment factor is: 0.483 − 0.05 × ln (ADM).
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Table 4-7. Summary Characteristics of State Finance Mechanisms
Characteristic
Instructional expenditure per pupil (2011)
Based on adequacy study
Support for at-risk students (incremental $)

MI

FL

IN

MA

MD

NH

NJ

PA

$5,791

$5,511

$5,445

$9,280

$8,712

$8,793

$10,131

$8,020

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(≈ $600)

Support for LEP students (incremental $)

No

Yes
(≈ $2,200)

Yes

Yes

(14.7% of per (≈$90)
pupil grant)

(≈ $2,500 (≈ $6,500) (≈ $1,750)
– 3,000)

(≈ $4,700 (≈ $3,800)
– 5,700)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

(7–34% of
per pupil
grant dep.
on grade)

(99% of
per pupil
grant)

($685)

(50% of
per pupil
grant)

(≈$35)

Grade-level adjustment

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Declining enrollment adjustment

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

Adjustments for intrastate price differences

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Adjustment for district size

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Summary. Table 4-7 summarizes several characteristics
of the financing mechanisms from the states just described
and for Michigan. Michigan, Florida, and Indiana all have
approximately the same level of instructional expenditure
per pupil; whereas the other five states in the table have
the resources to spend considerably more per pupil
for instruction. Four of the states base their support
on adequacy studies, and in each of those states, the
instructional support per student was over $8,000 in 2011.
All of the states except Florida provide additional revenue for
at-risk (or low-income) students. Note that Michigan’s level of
support, through the 31a categorical, is much lower than that
of other states that support at-risk students. Furthermore,
Michigan requires such students to be eligible for free meals,

not reduced-price meals. The level of support in Michigan
is also constrained by a pro-ration. The language of the
categorical indicates that the per-student support should be
11.5 percent of the foundation grant, which in 2013–14 would
have been about $815.
All of the states in the table except Michigan31 have extra
support for English language learners (in addition to the
funding for at-risk students). In most of the states, this is
available only to LEP students who are not eligible for at-risk
funding. Four of the states adjust funding by grade level. All
four of these weight high school highest; three weight middle
school higher than elementary school, and the other weights
elementary school higher than middle school. One of the
states, Florida, adjusts support for declining enrollment.

31
Some districts in Michigan offer instruction for English language learners. However, the documentation that we could find suggested that this was done on a
reimbursement basis from federal funds.
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Three of the states use price or wage differentials to adjust
local support, and three adjust the support for enrollment
size. As noted, Michigan does not make any of these
adjustments other than to provide extra funding for at-risk
students. Michigan fails to adjust funding for many cost
factors that exemplary states take into account. Even the
adjustment that Michigan does make for at-risk students is
much smaller. The state’s virtual “one size fits all” approach
is out of step with the leading states in terms of student
achievement.

F. The Cost of Closing the Gaps in Michigan’s
Student Achievement
1. Overall Student Achievement
We start with the question of whether academic performance
can be increased by simply spending more money. Our
empirical work suggests that money does make a difference.
Figure 2-1 displays the relationship between results on the
MEAP and revenue per pupil in Michigan after the passage of
Proposal A. The regression line that fit those data suggested
that an increase of $1,000 in revenue per pupil translated
to an increased MEAP passing rate of about 1.5 percentage
points. If we assume that the results from the MEAP can be
transformed to the NAEP, then the “good news” is that for
Michigan to match the U.S. average educational performance
it would take “only” an extra $2,000 per pupil in school
funding.32
Using MEAP results offers a good understanding of the likely
impact of increasing per-pupil revenue: not only is it specific
to the Michigan context, but the sudden and unexpected
large changes in per-pupil revenue in certain districts make
it easier to isolate the effects on achievement of greater
money from any other policy differences across districts.

The changes in Proposal A funding
per student by district can be viewed as
being a true natural experiment.
These MEAP results suggest that money, as it is typically
spent, matters. From a benefit-cost standpoint, these results
are somewhat encouraging. An extra $2,000 or so per
pupil, or around $30,000 over the entire K–12 period, would
move Michigan’s academic performance up to U.S. levels,
which would increase future earnings by about 2 percent,
or about $30,000 over an entire career. Of course, these
future earnings would have to be discounted somewhat to
reflect that a dollar 30 years from now is worth less than a
dollar today. However, the policy might pass a benefit-cost
test if we include other benefits of education other than
increased earnings. Some of these benefits include private
nonmonetary benefits, such as improved health and selfimage or greater reading enjoyment, and public nonmonetary
benefits, such as improved civic participation, less criminal
activity, and greater social cohesion.
Still, these results are discouraging in terms of policy
proposals to solve educational disadvantages by
simply spending more money. Even erasing the modest
disadvantage that Michigan has relative to the U.S. average
would require spending $2,000 extra per pupil per year. To
match a leading state such as Massachusetts would require
spending closer to an extra $10,000 per pupil.33

2. Gaps between Low-Income and Non-Low-Income
Students
The levels of additional funding that would be needed to
overcome the extremely large performance differentials
between low-income students and non-low-income students
are so large that simply trying to overcome the gap by

We assume a uniform percentile increase in student performance. The coefficient of 0.00146 times a $1,000 increase in per pupil funding will increase the MEAP
pass rate by 1.46 points. If this corresponds to a uniform percentile increase in all students’ performance, then for Michigan to match the U.S. advantage of 3.1
percentiles for low-income students, and 3.4 percentiles for non-low-income students, it would take higher spending of $2,123 for low-income students (= 3.1
percentiles ÷ 1.46), and $2,329 for non-low-income students (= 3.4 percentiles ÷ 1.46).
33
Massachusetts, as reported in Table 3-4 above, has an advantage in the NAEP over Michigan of 11.1 percentiles for low-income students and 14.7 percentiles for
non-low-income students. Dividing this by the 1.46 implied percentile effect of an extra $1,000 in per pupil funding yields an implied requirement that funding per
pupil increase by $7,603 (= $1,000 × 11.1 ÷ 1.46) or $10,068 (= $1,000 ×14.7 ÷ 1.46).
32
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investing more resources precludes serious contemplation.
We estimate that it would require directing to low-income
students more than double the current level of total spending
in districts with the average percentage of low-income
students.34 This is consistent with a broader research
literature on how much needs to be spent to overcome
performance gaps between low-income students and nonlow-income students. This research literature frequently
implies that the required extra spending is at least doubling
spending per student (Golebiewski 2011; Duncombe and
Yinger 2005). The gaps between school districts consisting
almost entirely of low-income students, versus districts with
almost no low-income students, imply that we would need
to spend perhaps four times the current level per pupil in the
former districts to eliminate the gap.35 It seems safe to say
that such increases for low-income students are infeasible.
But even though it is infeasible to close the test score gaps,
keeping the gaps from growing — that is, to achieve similar
academic progress for both income groups — will ultimately
result in a more equitable income distribution. Similar test

score gains for low-income and non-low-income students will
have similar dollar effects on adult earnings, on average, for
both groups. But because low-income students on average
have lower expected future earnings as adults than nonlow-income students, these similar dollar gains have much
larger percentage effects on future earnings. The earnings
distribution becomes more equal when we add similar dollar
future earnings to all income groups.
For example, as shown in Table 3-2, the gain in Michigan’s
NAEP score index for low-income students and non-lowincome students was similar, at 8 points for low-income
students and 8.5 points for non-low-income students. This
test score gain would be expected to result in similar dollar
gains in future earnings, which would be about 5–6 percent of
overall average earnings. But as a percentage of the expected
future earnings of both groups, this test score boost would
be expected to boost future earnings of low-income students
by 7.2 percent, versus 4.7 percent for non-low-income
students.36

If each $1,000 of extra spending increases performance by 1.46 percentiles as estimated in the regression reported in Figure 2-1, then the 28.4 percentile gap
between low-income and non-low-income students in Michigan on the NAEP would require extra spending of $19,452 (= $1,000 × 28.4 percentiles ÷ 1.46). Similar
calculations suggest that the 31.3 percentile gap in the MEAP between low-income students and non-low-income students would be overcome with an extra
$21,507 in spending.
35
As shown previously, the percentile gap between 100 percent low-income school districts and 0 percent low-income school districts is about 60.9 percentiles.
The implied extra required spending is $41,712 (=$1,000 × 60.9 ÷ 1.46).
The test score gains for low-income students move them from the 26.5 percentile to the 34.5 percentile of the 2013 test score distribution, a gain of 8 percentiles.
36
The test score gains for non-low-income students move them from the 54.0 percentile to the 63.4 percentile of the 2013 test score distribution, a gain of 9.4
percentiles. Based on Chetty et al. (2011), these percentile gains should be multiplied by 0.642 to predict percentage earnings gain as a percent of average adult
earnings, which yields 5.1 percent for low-income students and 6.1 percent for non-low-income students. But expected future earnings of low-income students
are 71.4 percent of overall average earnings, whereas expected earnings for non-low-income student are 130.1 percent of overall average earnings (Bartik 2014).
Therefore, the percentage boost for low-income students as a percent of their expected future earnings is 7.2 percent (= 5.1 ÷ 71.4), and percentage boost for nonlow-income students is 4.7 percent (= 6.1 ÷ 130.1).
34
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V: Policy Recommendations
A. Targeting Resources

academic deficiencies (Jacob and Lefgren 2004). High
school career academies that provide high-quality career and
The analyses of the extra resources needed to close gaps
technical education in small learning communities have also
at the end of the previous chapter simply look at the
educational performance effects of spending money without been shown to be quite cost-effective in improving student
outcomes, although these studies apply only to students
regard to exactly how that money is spent. However, certain
interested in career and technical education (Kemple 2008).
educational practices are known to more effectively raise
Studies of effective charter schools for low-income students
student achievement rather than simply increasing school
suggest that schools that lengthen the school year
funding across the board. Reducing class size in early
and use small group tutoring with high
elementary school is expensive, but it has
expectations for every student have
a larger effect per dollar on academic
much better academic results (Fryer
achievement and later outcomes
2012). Targeted math tutoring and
than aggregate increases in
counseling for students who are
Michigan
needs
school funding (Krueger 1999).
behind has also been shown
High-quality child care from
to
focus
any
increases
to be very cost effective in
birth to age 5 is also very
improving student outcomes
expensive, but, dollar-forin resources on
(Cook et al. 2015).
dollar, it has been shown

to improve outcomes for
policies and practices
Table 5-1 on the next page
disadvantaged students
with
a
higher
educational
summarizes the implications
more than a general increase
of
these studies for the
in K–12 funding (Bartik 2014).
impact
per
dollar.
relative costs and future
High-quality child care and
economic
benefits of various
preschool are cost-effective
educational policies. Simply
because these early interventions
increasing
education spending
take place when children’s brains
across the board has future earnings
are more malleable. Preschool can be
benefits
that are somewhat less than costs,
especially effective, as children can be taught
although the addition of non-pecuniary benefits (such
in larger class sizes than in early childhood, lowering costs.
as
better
health or reduced crime) might make this benefitPreschool has also been shown to be effective for both lowcost ratio exceed one. In contrast, there are many specific
income students and middle-class students, whereas child
economic policies that target particular grades, particular
care seems to make a significant difference only for lowgroups of students, or particular educational practices, and in
income students (Bartik 2014).
each case have economic benefit-to-cost ratios that greatly
exceed one. Given its limited fiscal capacity, Michigan needs
High-quality summer school for students who are behind
to focus any increases in educational resources on these
grade level is also a high-productivity activity if students
policies and practices with a higher educational impact per
can be motivated to engage in summer school, as it targets
dollar.
students who are behind and focuses on their specific
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Table 5-1. Future Economic Benefits and Program Costs of Various Educational Policies
Effect on Future
Earnings per Child

Program Costs
per Child

Economic Benefit
to Cost Ratio

Target Group

General school funding effects

$7,000

$11,000

0.6

All students

Full-time full-year child care 		
from birth to age 5 (Educare)
for disadvantaged families

$134,000

$87,000

1.5

Economically
disadvantaged students

Reduced class-size K–3

$22,000

$11,000

2.0

All students

Universal full-day pre-K

$53,000

$10,000

5.3

All students

High school career academies

$26,000

$3,000

8.7

Students interested in CTE

Mandatory elementary summer
school for one year for
children who are behind

$18,000

$2,000

9.0

Students who are
academically behind

One hour per day math tutoring
plus cognitive behavioral
therapy for disadvantaged 9th
graders

$54,000

$5,000

10.8

Students who are
academically behind

Five best school practices
(longer school year & school
day, small group tutoring,
frequent feedback to teachers,
more use of testing to guide
instruction, high expectations)

$26,000 per year

$2,000 per year

13.0

High-poverty schools

Policy

NOTE: Costs and benefits are discounted back to year intervention would begin. Costs and benefits are measured in year 2012 dollars. The social discount rate used is 3
percent. Future earnings are assumed to increase in real terms by 1.2 percent per year. Earnings effects are calculated either directly, or from test score impacts, based on
Chetty et al. (2011).

Thus, our first recommendation is that the state should
conduct a competitive grant program that we have dubbed
the Smart Educational Expenditure Demonstration (SEED)
program. Grants should go to traditional districts or charter
schools that implement an educational practice that has
been shown to be effective, such as the ones in the table.
The practices that get funded should be limited to teaching
and learning; that is, they should preclude non-instructional
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activities. We realize that Michigan does not currently
have a considerable level of resources to use to increase
its investment into education, but we suggest that a $200
million grant program may be feasible, especially given the
potential benefits relative to costs. If an effective intervention
has an average cost per student of $4,000, then a fouryear commitment to the SEED grants will serve 200,000
students. We also feel that this program can help shrink the
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achievement gap, so we recommend reserving two-thirds of
the grants for districts or charter schools with a large share of
students eligible for free or reduced-price meals.

Recommendation #1. The state should implement a
four-year competitive grant program for districts (traditional
and charter schools) to offer services/interventions that
have been shown to be highly effective at increasing student
achievement. The districts that receive grants will be required
to evaluate the efficacy of their service/intervention.37 A
funding level of $200 million for this Smart Educational
Expenditure Demonstration (SEED) initiative will serve
200,000 Michigan students. Two-thirds of the grants should
go to districts or charter schools with enrollments of over 50
percent of students eligible for free or reduced-price meals.
Intermediate school districts (i.e., regional education service
agencies) could both assist local districts (traditional and
charter) in preparing applications for the competitive grant
and in conducting the evaluations.

B. Local Enhancement Millages
An important result of Proposal A was to improve funding
equity across districts. Prior to 1994, the majority of district
funding came from operating millages on local property
approved by the district’s voters. In many locations, these
millages were often hard to pass or, if they did pass, did not
raise significant funds because of modest property values.
Having the state provide a larger share of funding meant
a more robust source of revenue for these locations. The
improved funding equity among districts that Proposal A
brought is laudable, and the system worked well for its first
few years because the state’s economy was relatively strong,
and legislators continued to increase the foundation grant.
However the state’s economy has stagnated so that its fiscal
capacity is quite limited. We believe that it is time to loosen
the straitjacket of Proposal A and allow local districts to raise
additional revenue through voter-approved local millages.

These supplemental millages would
restore to an extent communities’
opportunities to support their schools. In order
to promote equity across districts, we propose that
these millages be equalized by the state. We furthermore
would provide the revenue that gets raised per student to
charter schools located in the district.
We have performed simulations of various equalization
schemes and millage caps, but it is unclear how many
districts would pass a supplemental millage. If the cap is
set at 3.0 mills and the state guarantees that local districts
will receive at least as much funding per pupil per mill as
the district at the 80th percentile of taxable property value,
then approximately $750 million of additional revenue would
get injected into the system (about $600 million from local
property tax supplemented by $150 million from the state).
What can be done to increase the chances that any such
increased resources will be used for practices that have
a high educational achievement impact? Democratic
accountability due to local voting helps provide one incentive
for higher productivity activities, but we recommend that the
state should require local districts to provide voters with the
following information prior to the millage vote:
n how the supplemental funds will be used to
supplement not supplant other funding
n targeted student achievement gains from the
programs or practices to be funded
n how changes in student achievement will be
measured

Recommendation #2. Proposal A should be altered to
allow local districts to approve enhancement millages for
operating purposes of up to 3.0 mills per year for a maximum
of five years. The state should supplement approved millages
in districts that are relatively poor in property value.

Note that the Michigan Department of Education Program Evaluation Tool could be used for this evaluation or districts that receive a grant could use an
alternative, if it were at least as rigorous.
37
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C. Adequacy Study

D. At-Risk Students

Many states have undertaken adequacy studies. Aportela
et al. (2014) review 39 studies conducted in 24 states since
2003, and this count of studies omits from consideration
an important type of adequacy study referred to as an
econometric cost function approach. Michigan is about to
join the ranks of states with adequacy studies as it enacted
P.A. 555 of 2014, which was signed by the governor on
January 15, 2015. This law calls for an adequacy study to be
completed by March 31, 2016.

Michigan lags behind most other states in the achievement of
and funding for at-risk students. Furthermore, our analyses
show that when we proxy for at-risk status with eligibility
for free lunch, at-risk students’ danger of falling behind
on achievement is related to the concentration of at-risk
students in the district. Higher percentages of low-income
students in a district result in lower student achievement
for such students than average, and districts with lower
percentages of at-risk students have higher than average
results for the at-risk population. It is as if a low-income
student faces double jeopardy if he or she resides in a district
that has a high percentage of such students.

Undertaking an adequacy study is an investment, so it needs
to yield benefits that justify the cost. From our viewpoint,
the major advantage to such a study is that it would provide
decision-makers with necessary information. It is highly
unlikely that the managerial decision-makers at any firm or
enterprise that produces a good or service are unaware of
the cost of production of that good or service. Furthermore,
firms know the costs of each component of the process
of production. Yet, the educational system in Michigan
is a complex, multi-output enterprise that has very little
information about the cost of production. We do not know the
cost of producing an adequately educated student in each
grade. We do not know the cost of additional services that
might be necessary for at-risk or otherwise disadvantaged
students. We have no idea if the expectations that we have for
students in terms of achievement of knowledge and skills are
realistic given the level of resources that are provided.
Many of the adequacy studies that have been conducted
rely on professional judgments about the resources
required to provide an adequate education. We believe that
determination of adequacy should use an econometric
analysis of costs in addition to a qualitative approach. (See
Gronberg et al. 2004; Gronberg et al. 2011; Duncombe and
Yinger 2011).

Michigan has a vehicle for providing more funds to districts
for at-risk students, the Section 31a categorical, but relative
to other states, this categorical is significantly underfunded
and provides an equal level of per-pupil support no matter
the share of the district’s students that are low-income.
Given our analyses of student achievement, the need for
at-risk funding is greater the higher the percentage of at-risk
students in a district. Hence we advocate an allocation of
Section 31a funds in a progressive manner, i.e., one that
grants a greater per-student amount in districts that have a
greater concentration of at-risk students.
As a first step toward more appropriate support for at-risk
students, the state should increase the budget for this
categorical by $200 million. Half of that increase would bring
the total state support to about $415 million. The remainder
would support a weighting system where per-at-risk-pupil
support would be weighted by 1.0 plus 0.5 times the free and
reduced price lunch enrollment percentage in the district.
This weighting scheme would allow more resources to go to
districts with higher percentages of at-risk enrollment.

Recommendation #4. The state should increase its
Recommendation #3. The adequacy study mandated
by P.A. 555 should include an econometric analysis of cost
data as well as qualitative data from experts concerning what
constitutes best practice.
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funding level and institute a progressive funding structure
for aid for at-risk students (the section 31a categorical). To
account for the pernicious effects of concentrated poverty,
these funds should be allocated to districts with a formula
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that provides a larger per-student amount in districts
that have higher shares of at-risk students. Michigan’s
current extra funding for low-income students is very low
compared to the practices of states that are outpacing it
in educational achievement gains. Its funding practices
need to change, both to increase overall achievement and
to provide for greater equity in opportunities. We propose
weighting the per-pupil at-risk funding level by (1 + 0.5)
times the percentage of free and reduced price lunch eligible
enrollment in a district.

we recommend that if a district’s
enrollment drops substantially (by more
than 2 percent), the state should supplement
the district’s foundation grant support in the current
year with a flat payment equal to one-half of the foundation
grant times the net enrollment loss.38 Michigan is projected to
lose approximately 20,000 students between 2013–14 and
2015–16. If half of those annual losses were in districts where
the declining enrollment was more than 2 percent, then this
supplemental aid would total approximately $20 million.

E. Declining Enrollment

Recommendation #5. For districts that have declines in

A well-known shortcoming of a foundation grant system is
the financial hardship that it places on a district that has
declining enrollment. When a student leaves the district,
the full value of the foundation grant is lost in revenue, but
the district’s costs decline only by the marginal cost of the
student, which is generally less than the full value of the
foundation grant. If the enrollment decline is substantial
or prolonged, it may start a vicious downward spiral—
declining enrollment causes less revenue and higher costs
per (remaining) student. The higher costs per student may
ultimately cause cost cutting and declines in quality, which
may lead to further declines in enrollment.

enrollment of more than 2 percent in a year, state aid should
include an adjustment for declining enrollment that equals
one-half of the foundation grant times the net enrollment loss.

CRC (2015) suggests that using a blended student count
over three years will alleviate this problem. That may be a
reasonable policy solution. In general, smoothing dollar flows
over time helps to overcome temporary “shocks.” However,
we suggest that another solution would be an adjustment
to a district’s state aid payment that accounts for declining
enrollment. If a district that lost enrollment were to receive
the difference between the foundation grant and the marginal
cost of instruction for each student lost, then the services
it could provide per student would remain constant, thus
preventing the downward spiral. Unfortunately, the marginal
cost for each student is uncertain. However, in most cases it
is unlikely to exceed half of the foundation grant. Therefore,

F. Grade-Level Adjustments to the Foundation
Grant
Research on class size suggests that smaller class sizes are
especially important in early elementary grades. Because
more teachers are needed, maintaining smaller classes
early on suggests that costs will be higher for early grades
than for later elementary grades. To the extent that revenue
should reflect cost differentials, one would expect states to
provide more revenue per student in the early elementary
grades. Indeed, this is done in 13 states: Alabama, Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and
South Carolina.
The other grades where costs are relatively high occur in high
school. In grades 9–12, districts must pay for lab equipment,
more expensive instructional materials, and more specialized
teachers. When one compares funding in grades 9–12 with
funding in grades 4–8, we find that 11 states weight students
in the former grades more heavily than those in the latter:
Alabama, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South
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One reason why a declining enrollment supplement is better than a three-year blended student count is that it would not penalize a district with rapid growth,
where the marginal cost of additional teachers, classrooms, and transportation may exceed the average cost. A potential downside would be if it allows districts to
strategically “game” their student counts
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Carolina, and Utah. An additional advantage to providing
more funding on average to high school students is that it
gives districts a stronger incentive to prevent students from
dropping out of high school.

Recommendation #6. Michigan should alter Proposal A to

Implementation of these adjustments can be done without
changing the total amount of state aid by using weights
bigger than 1.0 for students in grades K–3 and 9–12 in
determining state aid and weights that are less than 1.0 for
students in grades 4–8. The advantage of these adjustments
is that revenue will more closely align with costs. The
disadvantage is that it will re-allocate funding with “gainers”
being districts with a higher proportion of students in early
elementary and high school grades and “losers” being
districts with a relatively lower proportion of students in
those grades. The latter may include urban districts with
higher dropout percentages.

These six recommendations recognize the constraints
imposed by the state’s fiscal situation. They call for a
modest increase in state support, but they also suggest that
resources can be brought to bear from local property wealth
in those districts that wish to increase their commitment to
education. Resources spent on policies and practices that
have research-based evidence of effectiveness can generate
large positive impacts.
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provide adjustments to the per-student foundation grant that
weights more heavily enrollments in grades K–3 and grades
9–12.

We believe that these recommendations will be a modest
first step along the road to K–12 educational excellence in
Michigan.

The Road to K-12
Excellence in Michigan
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